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I .  Introduction 
Problems in the allocation of lawmaking power between the federal � 
government and the states do not-and I am inclined to think that they •· 
should not-loom large in the traditional course on confl ict of laws. For 
federal law has had l ittle impact on the central topic of that course, the 
allocation of lawmaking power among the states, leaving the matter largely 
to states' discretionary choices.1 Yet it can be misleading to talk, and 
sloppy to think, about federal-state allocations in terms of choice.2 Where 
federal law, whatever its source, is pertinent and valid,  the Supremacy 
Clause makes the choice for us.3 To be sure, the question of pertinence 
may call for, as interstate choice of law often calls for, what Brainerd 
Currie termed "restraint and enlightenment. "4 It is not useful , however, 
to equate a court's role and function in answering questions regarding the 
pertinence and validity of federal law5 with the freedom of a state court to 
choose the governing law in an interstate case. 6 
1. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (plurality opinion); Douglas Laycock, 
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Con stitutional Foundation s of Choice of Law, 92 
COLUM. L. REv. 249, 257-58 (1992). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 
(1985) (holding that the application of Kansas law to every claim in a nationwide class action was 
" sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits"). Elsewhere, I have note.d this trend 
against constraints on legislative jurisdiction: 
[T)he uniform tendency of our domestic Jaw has been toward the loosening of 
mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power, federal and (inter-) state, 
with the result that meaningful limitations at both levels are the result of self­
restraint. In that process, courts have played a prominent role, if only by default. 
Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1460 (1991) (reviewing GARY 
B. BORN & DAVlD WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CiVlL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (1989)). 
2. But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("When a situation is covered by one of 
the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie 
choice."); RlCHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERlALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN C!VlL PROCEDURE 269 (6th 
ed. 1990) (asserting that United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), "required a choice 
between federal and state law"); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for 
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, l n.2 (1991) ("Choice between competing legal 
regimes is also necessary .. . when one party to litigation invokes a state law but the other party 
contends that federal law is exclusive and preempts the state law."). 
3. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is ThereLifefor Erie After 
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314, 318-21 (1980). 
4. BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED 
EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 186 (1963). Currie counsels courts, when determining the 
policies and interests of the forum state, to consider the possibility that a broad formulation may 
directly conflict with the interests of another state. It is proper, in this situation, to "adopt a moderate 
definition in order to avoid such a conflict." BRAINERD CURRIE, J11e Verdict of Quiescent Years, in 
SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, at 584, 604. The same course may be 
appropriate for a court interpreting the reach of federal law. 
5. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 342-44, 351 n.117, 353-54 n.l22 (discussing the 
process of considering the pertinence of federal law and pointing out that, once a court finds validity 
and pertinence, state law is irrelevant). 
6. Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-T11e Converse of the Erie 
Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 387 (1956) ("[O]nce the extent of the federal right is established 
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The recogmt10n of interstate judgments is also a staple in the 
traditional course on conflict of laws , and the emphases of that topic may 
seem to contradict, if not the normative, then the empirical proposition 
with which I began. 7 For federal law looms very large indeed in the 
recognition of interstate judgments . 8 In part because the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged the pertinence of oniy federal constitutional and statutory 
law, however, the mischief of federal-state "choice of law" has been 
avoided . 9 So, alas, have most of the interesting problems . These 
problems include sources of authority to make law, notably determining the 
pertinence and validity of federal common law, and sources of rules of 
law, notably fashioning governing federal law by the incorporation of 
existing state (or federal) rules . 10 Those are the problems I wish to 
address in this Article, having first set the contexts in which they arise. 
In theory, the reach of federal judgments law is broad, and the 
extent to which its reach has exceeded the Supreme Court's grasp goes a 
long way toward explaining the sorry state of the law of interjurisdictional 
preclusion today. The Court has recognized that, even though neither the 
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its implementing statute 
speaks to litigation that is wholly domestic to one state's courts, the Due 
Process Clause may constrain a state's domestic law of preclusion.11 The 
there is no room for the operation of local policy, as contrasted with the scope afforded to local policy 
in the conflict of laws.") . 
7. The same might be said of adjudicatory jurisdiction, although, as an empirical matter, I suspect 
that many conflicts teachers rely on the coverage in first-year procedure, revisiting the subject, if at all, 
only to make explicit links with choice of law. In any event, the only problem of allocation likely to 
be treated concerns the reach of an ackncwledged limitation on state lawmaking power-the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
8. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988). 
9. I have previously addressed this issue: 
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing statute have 
simplified the task in interjurisdictional cases involving state judgments, or so it has 
seemed. Thus, in the state-state configuration, the answers to most questions have, 
for many years, appeared clear. As a result, recognition of judgments was the least 
important-and perhaps the most welcome-part of a course in conflict of laws, one 
that could as well have been entitled workers' compensation. 
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: 
A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 73 4 (1986). 
10. In my previous work on judgments, I distinguish between "the source of preclusion law, 
federal or state, and . . .  the content of the law that may be applicable. "  See Burbank, supra note 9, 
at 823 n.428 (noting that the "distinction is often overlooked "). In refining that distinction for this 
Article, I have benefited from the work of Professor Maier. See Harold G. Maier, The A uthoritative 
Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 450 (1989) 
(distinguishing "the authoritative source of law from the substantial source of law"). 
11. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 482-83 (1982). In Kremer, the 
Supreme Court noted that a state must satisfy the applicable requirements of the Due Process Clause 
if a judgment rendered in its courts is to have preclusive effect. Elaborating, the Court stated that: 
A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm 
judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith and 
1554 Texas Law Review [Vol .  70: 1551 · 
Court has not acknowledged, however, other possible federal constraints 
on domestic state preclusion law in state court, including federal preemp- , 
tion or, as I prefer to think about it , federal common law . 12 Recent 
developments in cognate areas prompt renewed hope that the Court may 
see the IightY 
This failure to see the potential for federal constraints in addition to 
the Constitution in cases that are confined to the courts of one state has 
contributed to the Court 's fundamental error in interpreting the Full Faith 
and Credit Statute in interjurisdictional cases . That error l ies in imputing 
to the statute a choice of the domestic preclusion law of the rendering 
state, 14 rather than the law that would have been applied in the courts of 
the rendering state. 15 In theory, the latter could include not only domestic 
state preclusion law, but also the preclusion law of another state or federal 
preclusion law. The costs of the Court's error include not only the 
theoretical possibility that, in applying the domestic preclusion law of the 
rendering state, the recognizing court will apply law different from that 
which would have been applied in the courts of the rendering state, 
contrary to the core purpose of full faith and credit/6 but also the harsh 
reality that federal rights will disappear in the smoke (and mirrors) of a 
presumption against repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Statute by subse­
quently enacted federal legislationY Again, recent developments 
credit to such a judgment. Section 1738 does not suggest otherwise; other state and 
federal courts would still be providing a state court judgment with the "same" 
preclusive effect as the courts of the State from which the judgment emerged. In 
such a case, there could be no constitutionally recognizable preclusion at all. 
!d. (footnotes omitted). 
12. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 805. 
13. See infra Part II. 
14. See, e.g. , Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986) (holding that the 
"Court of Appeals erred by refusing to consider the possible preclusive effect, under Alabama law, of 
the state-court judgment"); Marrese v. American Academy cf Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U .S. 373, 
380 (1985) ("[The Full Faith and Credit Statute] directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law 
of the State in which judgment was rendered .�) . 
15. This is the interpretation suggested by the relevant language of the statute: 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, 
shall have the same. full faith and credit in every court within the United States and 
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken . 
28 U.S. C. § 1 73 8 (1988) (emphasis added) . It has always been so. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 
I Stat . 122. 
16. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 798-800. 
17. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U .S. 90, 98-99 (1980). In an earlier article, I criticized t!Je 
Supreme Court's repeal analysis: 
The sll-or-nothing posture of the first case in the recent series, Allen v. McCurry, 
449 U.S. 90 (1980). misdirected attention from the relationship between federal and 
state law to the question of preclusion or no preclusion. The Court purported to 
decide only that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not prevent the application of the "conve­









1992] Sources of Authority and Rules 1555 
demonstrate that this question of interpretation is not merely of academic 
interest. 18 
One might have thought that the Court, freed of the perceived 
constraints of the Full Faith and Credit Statute-as it has been in recent 
cases involving the preclusive effects of unreviewed state administrative 
proceedings in subsequent federal-question l itigation in federal court19-
would pay careful attention to sources of authority to make law and to 
federal interests . Instead, the Court has virtually ignored questions of 
power,20 sending decidedly mixed signals, even in the same case, on its 
will ingness to protect federal substantive policies and rights against the 
potential ravages of federal or state preclusion law.21 
In fact, it should not have been a surprise that, without the security 
blanket of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, the Court would ignore, by 
assuming the answer to, problems of lawmaking power. After all ,  the 
Court once sought to apply the Full Faith and Credit Statute to problems 
beyond its scope22-to determine the preclusive effects of federal judg­
ments in state courts . 23 More recently the Court has either simply as­
serted the applicabil ity of uniform federal law (federal-question 
judgments "fA or ducked any inquiry into governing law (diversity judgments):.S 
corpus was unavailable. Incredibly, the Court announced its repeal analysis . . . 
without, or so it said, first having determined what the full faith and credit statute 
requires . . . .  The Court's repeal analysis can be made to appear sensible if§ 1 738 
embodies a choice of domestic state preclusion law. It cannot be made even to 
appear sensible if, as I maintain, the full faith and credit statute chooses not the 
preclusion law of the rendering state, but the preclusion law that the courts of the 
rendering state would apply. In fact, the Court's repeal analysis makes no sense 
on its own terms, and a repeal analysis based on a correct interpretation of§ 1 738 
might in some cases yield the conclusion that § 1 738 does not apply. 
Burbank, supra note 9, at 814 n.388 (citations omitted). 
18. See infra subpart ID(A). 
19. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, IllS. Ct. 2166, 2170 (1990); University 
of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U. S. 788, 79 4 (1986). 
20. See So/imino, Ill S. Ct. at 2169-70; Elliott, 478 U. S. at 794; infra text accompanying notes 
90-94. 
2 1. See infra text accompanying notes 63-88. 
22. "Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the implementing statute 
appears to speak to the preclusive effects of the proceedings of federal courts. " Burbank, supra note 
9, at 736. 
23. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 1 65, 1 70 (1938) ("[f]he judgments and decrees of the federal 
courts in a state are declared to have the same dignity in the courts of that state as those of its own 
courts in a like case and under similar circumstances."); Embry v. Palmer, 1 07 U.S. 3, 1 0  (1883) 
(noting that the judgments of federal courts have been recognized as on the "same footing " with state 
court decisions). But see Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418, 423 (1877) (" [T]he act of Congress [the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute] does not apply to the courts of the United States . . . .  "); Burbank, supra 
note 9, at 745 (arguing that "the Court's exercise in statutory interpretation [in Embry, 1 07 U.S. at 9] 
merely blessed an anterior exercise in federal common law "). 
24. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 n.l2 (1971) 
(" !n feders.l-question cases, the law applied is federal law. "). 
25. There are, however, numerous pre-1938 decisions requiring the application of state preciusion 
1556 Texas Law Review [Vol. 70:155 1  
Finally in this depressingly long list of interesting problems that the 
Court has either made uninteresting or wished away, for close to one 
hundred years the Court has essentially abandoned internationally foreign 
judgments,26 leaving Hilton v. Guyot27 a derelict on the waters of the 
law and one that might be thought to pose greater than normal risks 
precisely because it l ies in international waters . Hilton ,  it turns out 
however, is not the problem, and the Court cannot solve the real problem, 
because it lacks both the power and the institutional capacity to do so.28 
II. Federal Judgments Law in Domestic State Litigation 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Due Process Clause 
constrains a state's freedom in according preclusive effect to the judgments 
of its own courts . 29 To date, however, it has not acknowledged that 
federal law may play a larger role in determining the preclusive effects of 
these judgments in domestic state l itigation.30 I have previously argued 
that although state preclusion law will usually apply, it must, on occasion, 
yield to federal common law.31 I will not repeat that argument in full 
here, but it may be useful for the benefit of skeptics to explore the 
relevance of two Supreme Court cases decided since I developed, and 
applied to domestic state l itigation, a general approach to federal common 
law.32 
Possible reasons for skepticism about the role of federal preclusion 
law in state litigation include the knowledge that (1)  only rarely has the 
Court directed the displacement of state "procedural" law in state court33 
and (2) for a long time it seemed to do so only in FELA34 cases .35 Yet, 
as a general matter, there can be no doubt either about federal lawmaking 
competence in connection with " [l]egal rules which impact significantly 
law to federal diversity judgments. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 748-53. 
26. Hereafter, I shall refer to internationally foreign judgments as simply "foreign judgments," 
distinguishing them from interstate judgments. 
27. 159 U. S. 113 (1895). 
28. See infra subparts IV(B)-(C). 
29. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. 
31. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 810-17; William V. Luneburg, The Opporrunity to be Heard 
and the Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81, 138-44, 157-62 
(1986); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HAR.v. L. REV. 1128, 1183-84 
& n. 281 (1986). 
32. See generally Burbank, supra note 9. 
33. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R. , 342 U. S. 359 (1952); Henry M. Hart, Jr. , The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954). 
34. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). 
35. See Hill, supra note 6, at 387-88 (noting in FELA cases "a judicial tendency ... to ascribe 
to Congress an intention that federally-created rights sh[ouldj receive uniform enforcement .. . 
notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of the state courts in such enforcement"). 
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upon the effectuation of federal rights "36 or about the potential of 
preclusion rules to have such an impact. And if there had been any doubt 
about the relevance of the former proposition, announced in federal court 
litigation, for litigation in state court, Felder v. Casey37 should have 
dispelled it. 
In Felder, the Court required the displacement of a Wisconsin 
notice-of-claim statute that the state courts had applied to terminate an 
action brought under section 1983 .38 It is true that in doing so, the Court 
invoked the language of preemption.39 But there is no harm in the 
language of preemption, backed up by appeals to the Supremacy Clause,40 
36. Burks v. Lasker, 44 I U.S. 471, 477 (1979). In Burks, the Court "made progress in collapsing 
analytical barriers by citing a case displacing state law in state court as sufficiently analogous to lend 
support to a discussion of the borrowing of state law in federal court." Burbank, supra note 9, at 807 
n.359. 
37. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see Felder, 487 U.S. at 136-37. The Court described the notice-of-
claim statute as follows: 
That statute provides that no action may be brought or maintained against any state 
governmental subdivision, agency, or officer unless the claimant either provides 
written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury, or demonstrates 
that the relevant subdivision, agency, or officer had actual notice of the claim and 
was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice. Wis. Stat. § 893.80(l )(a) (1983 
and Supp. 1987). The statute further provides that the party seeking redress must 
also submit an itemized statement of the relief sought to the governmental 
subdivision or agency, which then has 120 days to grant or disallow the requested 
relief. § 893 .80(1)(b). Finally, claimants must bring suit within six months of 
receiving notice that their claim has been disallowed. Ibid. 
/d. (footnote omitted). 
39. See id. at 138. As I have noted elsewhere, "[m]y quarrel is not, of course, with the choice 
of the 'preemption' label instead of 'federal common law.' It is rather with the failure to see the 
problems whole. Preemptive lawmaking is a subset of federal common law." Burbank, supra note 
9, at 808 n.360; see also id. at 809 n.366 (arguing that "[t]he tendency of commentators to speak the 
language of preemption rather than federal common law in the context of state court litigation is 
suggestive of the larger issue" of the failure of the Court to address the relationship between preemption 
principles and federal common law); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courrs, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 32-39 (1985) (noting the Court's failure to realize that preemptive lawmaking 
can be used to develop a general theory of federal common law). 
It is also true that at one point the Court employed a mode of analysis-treating the problem 
as !he converse of that in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)-as mischievous as assimilating 
federal-state allocation problems to interstate choice of law. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 151-53; supra text 
accompanying notes 1-6. By analogy to Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Court 
equated the federal courts' constitutional obligations under Erie with the state courts' "constitutional 
duty" under the Supremacy Clause. This is unfortunate. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 755-57, 808-
10. The problem derives in part from the Court's apparent failure to recognize that Guaranty Tmst 
cannot plausibly be deemed a constitutional holding. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of 
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 700-06 (1974). The converse-Erie reasoning was, however, unnecessary 
to the decision. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 151. 
40. See id. at 138, 150, 151, 153. The Court's invocation of the Supremacy Clause to vindicate 
the supremacy of a federal statute should be distinguished from Professor Weinberg's attempt to make 
the Supremacy Clause the source of authority for federal com1non law. See Louise Weinberg, Federal 
Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 836-38 ( I  989); see also infra note 51. 
1558 Texas Law Review [Vol . 70:1 55 1 
so long as the reader observes that in Felder state law was made to yield, 
not to an identifiable statutory policy choice, but to "the remedial 
objectives of § 1983 .  "41 It would be more faithful to the respective 
lawmaking roles of Congress and the federal courts to say that in Felder 
the Supreme Court required that a state statute yield, in state court, to 
federal common law. 
Preclusion law can cut off assertions of legal right made for the first 
time. In that, it is functionally similar to the notice-of-claim statute in 
Felder for purposes of allocating federal and state lawmaking power. 
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that Felder was not a FELA case. 
Indeed, the Court's extensive use of FELA precedent42 merely confirmed 
arguments imputing to those cases the general principle that state proce­
dural law must, on occasion, yield to federal common law in state court.43 
Another of the Supreme Court's recent decisions similarly confirmed 
those arguments , albeit indirectly. In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,44 
the Court held that unreviewed state administrative findings cannot have 
preclusive effect in a subsequent Title VII action .45 In the Court's view, 
for a federal court to accord state administrative factual findings preclusive 
effect would have been inconsistent with the statutory direction that a 
federal administrative agency, the EEOC, give such findings only 
"substantial weight . "46 In addition , a rule of preclusion would have been 
inconsistent with the previously recognized statutory pol icy in favor of a 
trial de novo following administrative proceedings . 47 
Elliott was brought in federal court . What if, however, the plaintiff 
had chosen to sue in state court? Imagining such a case before the 
Supreme Court's decision in Elliott and its recent decision making clear 
that state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction under Title 
VII,48 I observed: 
In other cases, policies animating federal substantive law 
may require a rule less preclusive than that provided by 
domestic state law. If, for example, we assume that state courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction of title VII actions, the question 
4 1 .  Felder, 487 U .S.  at 13 8 .  
42 . See id. at 1 3 8  (citing Brown v.  Western R . R . ,  3 3 8  U . S. 294, 296 (1949)) ; id. at ISO (citing 
Brown and Monessen S.W .  Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U .S .  330, 336 (1988)); id. at 1 52 (citing Brown). 
43 . See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 45, at 272-73 (4th ed . !983); 
BurbRnk, supra note 9, at 807- 10;  Meltzer, supra note 3 1, at 1 1 80-85 . 
44. 478 U . S .  788 ( 1986). 
45 . !d. at 796. 
46. !d. at 795 (citing 42 U.S .C.  § 2000e-S(b) ( 1988)) . 
47. !d. at 795-96. See also Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S .  840, 848 ( 1976) (observing that 
Congress intended in the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 to accord federal employees the same right 
to a trial de novo as was provided in the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964) . 
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may arise whether in such an action brought in state court, that 
court can apply domestic law according preclusive effect to the 
adjudicatory proceedings of a state administrative agency that is 
a deferral agency under title VII. A strong argument can be 
made that application of the state rule would be inconsistent with 
policies animating title VII. Because the EEOC is required to 
give only "substantial weight" to administrative findings of 
deferral agencies, and assuming Congress did not intend in that 
regard to distinguish between investigative and adjudicatory 
administrative action, it makes no sense to permit a court, 
federal or state, to give those findings preclusive effect. Doing 
so would seriously undermine the federal administrative 
process.49 
1 559 
I hope we can agree, at least after Felder, that the reasons the Court gave 
for refusing to apply a rule of preclusion to the Title VII claim in Elliott 
would also require displacement of a state-law rule of preclusion if that 
case had been filed in state court. Moreover, even though we may not 
agree about the role of the Rules of Decision Act50 in bringing about the 
results, 51 or about the util ity of "preemption" analysis/2 we should be 
49. Burbank, supra note 9, at 813 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 821 n.419 ("The Court's 
reasons for refusing preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration award in a federal § 1983 action are 
equally applicable in a state § 1983 action."). 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."). 
51. For a fully developed statement of my views about the role of the Rules of Decision Act in 
authorizing and limiting federal common law, see Burbank, supra note 9, at 753-74, 787-97, 808-10, 
816-17. Professor Redish now agrees with me, at least as to the relevance of the Act for federal 
common law that is not "procedural." See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 
POLITICAL ORDER 29-46 (1991); Burbank, supra note 1, at 1479 n.l26. 
Professor Weinberg terms it "curious" that she does "not find scholarly discussion of the 
meaning of the words [in the Rules of Decision Act], 'except where the Constitution ... otherwise 
require[s].' " Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme 
Federal Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 860, 865 n.28 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Curious Notion]. 
Because! have devoted considerable attention to that language, I agree. See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note 
9, at 758-62, 773-74, 787-91. If Professor Weinberg had seriously engaged work other than Professor 
Redish's, she might have found what she was looking for; Professor Redish's work takes an 
impoverished view of the Rules of Decision Act. See REDISH, supra, at 161 n.95; George D. Brown, 
Bright Lines, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 293, 297-302, 308-11 (reviewing REDISH, supra). What I find 
curious is the notion that the "supremacy clause requires courts to . . .  fashion federal case law." 
Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 865; see also id. at 870 ("[A]s the Constitution requires . . .  all 
courts must work under federal common law when the supremacy clause so requires."); Weinberg, 
supra note 40, at 816-17, 836-38 (reiterating Weinberg's view of the Supremacy Clause). The 
Supremacy Clause is not a source of lawmaking power; it merely states that valid and pertinent federai 
law is supreme. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107..09 
(1989); Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. 
L. REv. 233,242-43 (1991); Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 370. 
I also find curious Professor Weinberg's reliance on the fact that the Rules of Decision Act 
speaks directly only to federal courts as proof against the Act's relevance to federal common-law 
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able to agree that the results themselves are not easily explained by 
traditional federal common-law analysis . 53 
III . Federal Judgments Law in Interjurisdictional Cases 
A. Federal Common-Law Analysis and Repeal Analysis Distinguished 
Once it is clear that, in  l itigation confined to the tribunals of one 
state, the governing preclusion law need not be domestic state law, but may 
making. See Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 862, 865, 870. We agree that state courts are bound 
to apply pertinent and valid federal common law, and that they have an obligation to determine whether 
there is such law and what its content is in cases before them. See id. at 871-73; Burbank, supra note 
9, at 800, 807- 1 0 .  Professor Weinberg also recognizes that state court decisions on matters involving 
federal common law are reviewable by the Supreme Court. See Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 
873 . The Supreme Court is a federal court bound by the Rules of Decision Act and, incidentally, so 
regarded itself even when the Act referred to "trials at common law . "  Compare id. at 869-70 
(suggesting a process of inference without authority) with Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236 
( 1 944) ("It is the duty of the federal appellate courts, as well as the trial court, to ascertain and apply 
the state law where, as in this case, it controls decision. ") and McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
270, 277 ( 1 830) (noting that state statutes of limitations "form a rule of decision in the courts of the 
United States" unless Congress has made "special provision") . When p redicting what the Supreme 
Court would hold on an unsettled question of federal common law, a sensible state court would take 
into consideration limitations on the Court's lawmaking powers. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 809 
n.366.  
Anyone interested in the other objections Professor Weinberg makes will find all  of them 
addressed, I hope adequately, in the same article. See, e.g., id. at 761  n . l 21 (discussing various 
techniques to avoid confronting the Rules of Decision Act); id. at 761 -62 (comparing federal common 
law under the Rules of Decision Act and under traditional analysis) . And anyone who thinks that 
Clearfield Trust, Sabbatino, or Borak are strong points in an argument against the relevance of the 
Rules of Decision Act to federal common-law making should follow Professor Weinberg's own advice 
and do "much more thinking about the Act." Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 870 . In doing so, 
I would hope that interested persons, including Professor Weinberg, would distinguish between sources 
of authority and sources of rules. Cj .  Burbank , supra note 9, at 771 ("When required to displace state 
law, federal judges have the p ower to fashion a substitute that is fully adequate in light of all of the 
policies and interests that a common law court would consider . . . .  "); id. at 766-67 (questioning 
whether the existence of a federal interest requires uniform federal rules) . 
52 . See supra text accompanying notes 39-4 1 .  
53. See Burbank, supra note 9 ,  at 808- 1 0  (noting that analysis of federal law in state court suggests 
deficiencies in traditional federal common-law analysis); cj. Monaghan, supra note 5 1 ,  at 253 n . l 26 
("Although state courts may be obliged to entertain jurisdiction and to provide a remedy materially 
parallel to the federal remedy . . .  federal preemption of state jurisdictional,  procedural, and remedial 
rules to the extent that they obstruct enforcement of federal law does not pro tanto transform the 
character of the state courts . " ) .  
I t  would be confounding to  speak of  state preclusion law operating as borrowed federal law 
in state court. So long as the Rules of Decision Act is on the statute books, I know of nothing that 
makes either the notion or the description of judicial borrowing more acceptable to explain results in 
federal court. It cannot be the common ground that there is federal judicial power to prevent conflict 
between state law and a scheme of federal substantive rights . We should reserve talk about judges 
borrowing state law for situations when federal courts fashion uniform judge-made rules and they 
choose to model them on state law. See In re lnflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft 
Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1 986, 778 F. Supp. 625, 63 1 -32 (E .D . N  .Y. 1991) .  State law 
very rarely applies of its own force in federal court, and when it does not, the Rules of Decision Act, 
reflecting Congress's borrowing, is the source of authority for its application. See Burbank , supra note 
9, at 762, 770-7 1 .  
Sources of Authority and Rules 156 1  
rather be the preclusion law of another state o r  federal law, the house of 
cards that the Supreme Court has constructed in recent cases involving the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute collapses .54 It would hardly unify the 
country to require a recognizing court to apply a different preclusion law­
namely, the domestic preclusion law of the rendering state-than the 
rendering state's courts themselves would apply. 55 The Full Faith and 
Credit Statute thus means what is says/6 and because it makes no choice 
of law, the search for another statute expressly or impliedly repealing it is 
usually a wild goose chase. 57 Such a search makes sense only when it is 
proposed to depart from the choice that Congress did make in the Full 
Faith and Credit Statute, namely the choice of the rendering state's courts 
as the referent for determining the governing preclusion law in the courts 
of other states and in federal courts . 58 
What difference does it make whether the Full Faith and Credit 
Statute is interpreted to choose, as the Supreme Court has required, the 
domestic preclusion law of the rendering state or, as I advocate, the law 
that would be applied in the courts of the rendering state? In theory, it 
may make a substantial difference, or so I have argued . The measure of 
that difference lies in a comparison of the reach or impact of federal 
common law, on the one hand, and of express or implied repeals by 
subsequently enacted federal statutes , on the other. 59 In practice, the 
54. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
55. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
56. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
57. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Moreover, even accepting the Court's interpretation 
of§ 1738, "repeal analysis should focus on the question whether [Congress intended] that preclusion 
questions ... arising [under a subsequently enacted statute] be detennined by (uniform) federal rather 
than state law. After all, state law may not preclude." Burbank, supra note 9, at 817-18. 
58. Attention to Congress's choice of a state court referent causes problems when another statute 
evinces special concern for a federal forum: 
The solicitude of the 1871 Congress for the availability of a federal forum 
has led to holdings that section 1983 expressly authorizes an injunction within the 
meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act and that the normal rule regarding exhaustion 
of administrative remedies does not apply in section 1983 actions. In light of that 
solicitude, when a plaintiff has exercised a preference for a federal forum to pursue 
a claim under section 1983, is there not something odd in pretending that he did not 
exercise that preference? Yet that is exactly what the reinterpreted full faith and 
credit statute requires. From this perspective-when the right question is asked­
the two statutes reasonably may be deemed "in irreconcilable conflict." 
Burbank, supra note 9, at 818 (footnotes omitted); cf. id. at 825 (arguing that § 1738 does not apply 
in cases raising claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
59. Elsewhere, I have compared the reach of the Supreme Court's repeal analysis with the reach 
of federal com..'!1on law: 
The Supreme Court's repeal analysis requires clear evidence of congressional intent 
on a specific issue that Congress rarely addresses. Apart from the fact that the 
basic premise of the Court's repeal analysis is wrong, the analysis imposes entirely 
too much on unsuspecting Congresses, that is, on all Congresses legislating before 
1980. This is hardly the heyday of federal common law, even in its traditional 
manifestations. But, on the assumption that the reinterpreted full fait.IJ and credit 
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Court's failure to see the displacement of state "procedural" law in state· 
court as but another manifestation of federal common law may have 
narrowed the theoretical gap considerably, 60 and that failure no doubt' �. 
would support the view that the difference between federal common law 
and repeal analysis is only of academic interest. Yet, however flawed the 
Court's reasoning in Felder v. Casey,61 the case stands as contemporary 
evidence that a general approach to the problem of allocating federal and 
state lawmaking power is possible. Federal common law is the most 
appropriate vehicle. 62 
The Supreme Court's recent forays into interjurisdictional preclusion 
speak with a forked tongue on this question. In Elliott, with the Full Faith 
and Credit Statute rightly or wrongly out of the picture, 63 the Court 
thought, rightly or wrongly, that it was required to confront the problem 
of federal common law.64 The Court's conclusion in Elliott, that a rule 
of preclusion would be inconsistent w ith Title VII, 65 although supported 
by specific language in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. , 66 is 
difficult to reconcile with the holding in, or general tenor of, Kremer.67 
statute applies, federal common law analysis, whether of the traditional type or 
under the Rules of Decision Act, holds greater potential to protect federal 
substantive rights than does the Court's repeal analysis. 
Burbank, supra note 9, at 819 (footnotes omitted). I also described this difference as "the difference 
between 'asking what collateral or subsidiary rules [of preclusion] are necessary to effectuate or to 
avoid frustrating the specific intentions of [Congress],' . . . and requiring evidence of specific intent 
as to preclusion matters. " Id. at 819 n.413 (quoting Merrill, supra note 39, at 36); see also Luneburg, 
supra note 31, at 143-44 (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach adopts an unnecessarily restrictive 
reading of § 1738 and requires finding an implied repeal of that statute). 
60. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. 
61. 487 U.S. 131 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 38-41. 
62. Cf Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 
1057, 1069-70 (1989) ("The Supreme Court in Felder is continuing a trend toward minimizing the role 
of state law, maximizing the creation of federal common law, and exalting the desirability of uniformity 
between state and federal courts in adjudication of federal rights."). 
63. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986). The Court may have 
surrendered too easily on the question whether 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applies to administrative proceedings. 
To be sure, the statute refers to the "judicial proceedings of any court." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988). 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, uses the language "judicial Proceedings," U.S. CONST. 
art. rv, § 1, and applies to state administrative proceedings as well. See Thomas v. Washington Gas 
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270-72 (1980). The Clause, by its own terms, does not bind federal courts. 
See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938). There is no evidence that the First Congress intended 
a different meaning in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, passed to implement and make applicable to 
the federal courts the Full Faith and Credit Clause. When the Statute was first passed, administrative 
proceedings were not even contemplated, and thus perhaps they should not be excluded from the 
Statute. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795 (noting that both the Constitution and § 1738 "antedate the 
development of administrative agencies"). 
64. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794. 
65. See id. at 795-96; supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
66. 456 U.S. 461, 470 n.7 (1982) , quoted in Elliott, 478 U. S. at 793. 
67. In Kremer, the Court held that Title VII did not expressly or impliedly repeal the Full Faith 
and Credit Statute, and it did so without resolving whether claims under Title VII were within the 
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The key is that Kremer, in which state proceedings did have preclusive 
effect in subsequent Title VII l itigation, involved administrative 
proceedings reviewed by a state court, thus triggering the Full Faith and 
Credit Statute and the Court's repeal analysis .68 Elliott, in which no 
preclusion was permitted as to Title VII, seems to confirm my contention 
that federal common-law analysis is more protective of federal policies and 
federal substantive rights than is repeal analysis . 69 
But what the Court in Elliott confirmed in one part of the opin ion, 
it confuted in another. The Court held that the unreviewed state ad­
ministrative proceedings could preclude Ell iott's claim under section 1983 . 
In doing so, the Court relied very heavily on cases finding no express or 
implied partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, concluding that 
" [t]he Court's discussion in Allen suggests that it would have reached the 
same result even in the absence of § 1738 .  "70 Perhaps, but only because 
the Court in Allen was confused about the relationship between judge-made 
law and statutes .71 Repeal analysis requires very clear evidence of 
Congress's intent as to the specific question of preclusion. As the Court 
demonstrated in McDonald v. City of West Branch72 and elsewhere in 
Elliott itself, federal common-law analysis should consider whether a judge­
made rule of preclusion is consistent with the language, structure, and 
policies of a statute viewed as a whole. 73 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Kremer, 456 U. S. at 476, 479 n.20. 
68. See id. at 469-70 & n.7;  see also Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 829 F.2d 1056, 1067 
n.24 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Court in Kremer rejected arguments based on congressional intent 
"where the full faith and credit statute applies because a state courr judgment is involved " (emphasis 
in original)). 
69. "The question actually before us is whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be 
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting Title VII." Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796; see supra text 
accompanying notes 59-61; see also Gjellum, 829 F.2d at 1068 (stating that " [t]he Court's treatment 
of issue preclusion questions in the Title VII context therefore suggests that the full faith and credit 
statute is a more stringent requirement than the policies favoring resort to state preclusion law where 
section 1738 is inapplicable");  Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1294 (7th Cir. 1987) ("But 
the intent of Congress was no more explicit in the context of Title VII, yet the Supreme Court in Elliott 
had no difficulty in inferring it. "). 
70. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797. 
71 . The Court seemed to equate "the traditional rules of preclusion " with § 1738 for purposes of 
its repeal analysis. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-99 (1980); Burbank, supra note 9, at 807 
n.358; infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
72. 466 u.s. 284 (1984). 
73. See id. at 292 (" [A)ccording preclusive effect to arbitration awards in § 1983 actions would 
surely undermine the protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to provide. ");  see also 
Elliott, 478 U. S.  at 795-96; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985); supra 
text accompanying notes 44-47, 63-69. Professor Chemerinsky misreads Elliott as if the Court's 
conclusion about Elliott's § 1983 claim also applied to his Title VII claim. See ERWIN CHEMERlNSKY, 
FEDERAL JURJSDICTION § 8.10, at 442-43 (1989). Misreadings of Elliott are common, however. See, 
e.g. , Nelson v. Jefferson County, Ky., 863 F.2d 18, 19 (6th Cir. 1988) (neglecting two of the three 
prerequisites to preclusion adopted in Elliott) , cerr. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); Buckhalter v. Pepsi-
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The Court's most recent interjurisdictional preclusion decision . 
although hardly a model of analytical precision, highlights the differenc� · .  
at issue. I n  Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass 'n v. Solimino/4 the
· 
question was whether the unreviewed findings of a state administrative 
agency have preclusive effect in a subsequent federal action under the Age _, . 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) .75 In holding that 
such findings have no preclusive effect, the Court reasoned that there is a 
presumption of "administrative estoppel , "76 but that it is "properly 
accorded sway only upon legislative default, applying where Congress has 
failed expressly or impliedly to evince any intention on the issue. •m 
More important for present purposes, the Court distinguished this "lenient 
presumption in favor of administrative estoppel "78 from a rule of clear 
statement and "the kindred rule that legislative repeals by implication will 
not be recognized 'absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the 
contrary. ' "79 
Two factors suggest that the Court tracked the distinction between 
federal common-law analysis and repeal analysis in Solimino: ( 1 )  its 
observation that repeal analysis did "not cast its shadow here"80 because 
the Full Faith and Credit Statute did not apply, and (2) its actual implemen­
tation of the " lenient presumption in favor of administrative estoppel . "81 
Unlike Title VII, on which it was modeled, the ADEA contains no 
direction to the EEOC to accord "substantial weight" to state administrative 
findings . 82 The linchpin of the Court's analysis in Elliott with respect to 
Title VII was,  thus,  not available in Solimino. 83 Nonetheless,  the Court 
found other evidence of what it chose to call the congressional "decision" 
not to accord preclusive effect to state administrative findings . 84 In 
Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892, 893 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating erroneously that Elliott was 
"precluded from relitigating his civil rights claim under . . .  § 1983 "); id. at 895-97 (neglecting to note 
whether the arbitration proceedings would have preclusive effect in the rendering state). 
74. 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988). 
76. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. at 2169. 
77. !d. at 2170. 
78. Id. at 2172. 
79. ld. at 2170 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 4 1 7  U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
80. ld. 
81. ld. at 2172. 
82. Id. at 2171-72. 
83 . The Court, however, found nothing "talismanic " about Title VII's directive. !d. at 2172. 
This language was "simply the most obvious piece of evidence that administrative res judicata does not 
operate in a Title Vll suit." I d. (quoting Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 
1987)). 
84. I d. Particularly because the Court noted the district court's holding in favor of preclusion "by 
virtue of Congress' failure in either the language or legislative history of the Age Act ' actually [to] 
addres[s] the issue, '"  id. at 2169 (quoting the district court), such hyperbole (characterizing 
congressional inaction as a decision) makes even preemption rhetoric sound good. See supra text 
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reality, the evidence supported only the conclusion that a judge-made rule 
of administrative preclusion would be inconsistent with the structure of, 
and policies animating, the ADEA.85 That, of course, is all that is neces­
sary under federal common-law analysis.  86 Unlike its treatment of section 
1983 in Elliott, 87 in Solimino the Court made a serious attempt to grapple 
with the implications of preclusion for the statutory scheme. 88 
B. Untangling Sources of Authority from Sources of Rules 
The use of federal common-law analysis rather than repeal analysis 
under the Full Faith and Credit Statute is thus of both theoretical and 
practical interest . Yet were the Court aware of the issue, it still might be 
reluctant to adopt the interpretation I have urged . 89 Under the Court's 
approach to section 1738 ,  there usually is no question either about the 
source of authority (federal) or the source of rules (state) . My approach 
invites questions as to both the source of authority and the source of rules 
by requiring inquiry as to the law that would have been applied if the 
subsequent action had been brought in the rendering state's courts rather 
than in the courts of another state or in federal court. 
Even when section 1 738 does not apply in interjurisdictional cases, 
the Court appears reluctant to be precise about sources of authority or 
sources of rules . Neither in Elliott nor in Solimino did the Court discuss 
the authority for the application of federal law. Rather, the Court simply 
assumed that, although the Full Faith and Credit Statute did not apply, 
federal law governed and that its only task was to determine the content of 
that law .  SQ For one familiar with cases involving the preclusive effects 
of the federal-question judgments of federal courts , 91 Elliott's laconic 
accompanying note 52. 
85. See So/imino, I l l S .  Ct. at 2 172 (holding that § 1 4(b) of the ADEA, which requires 
complainants under the Act to first pursue their claims with responsible state authorities before filing 
federal actions, "suffices to outweigh the lenient presumption in favor of administrative estoppel, a 
holding that also comports with the broader scheme of the Age Act and the provisions for its 
enforcement") .  
86 .  See supra text accompanying note 73 . 
87 .  See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 . 
88 .  So/imino, I l l  S. Ct. at 2 1 70-71 . Although in So/imino the Court quoted a passage from Allen 
that seemed highly protective of judge-made rules of preclusion, 1 1 1  S .  Ct. at 2 1 7 1  (quoting Allen v .  
McCurry, 449 U . S .  90 ,  97-98 (1980)), contrasting § 1 983 with Title Vll, i t  did not recognize, o r  a t  
least acknowledge, that i n  Allen and that part o f  Elliott treating § 1 9 8 3 ,  the Court had applied a 
different analysis. See supra text accompanying note 7 1 .  
89.  I do not refer to suspicions that the Court's rediscovery of the Full Faith and Credit Statute 
in civil rights cases was no coincidence. For an explanation of my views on this subject, see Burbank, 
supra note 9, at 80 1 . 
90. See University of Tenn . v. Elliott, 478 U .S .  788, 79�·-95, 796-97 (1986); Solimino, 1 1 1  S .  
C t .  a t  2 1 69-70. 
9 1 .  See supra text accompanying note 24. 
l 
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observation that "we have frequently fashioned federal common-law rules 
of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute"92 is not surprising. 
Indeed, the Court cited some of those cases in support of its observa­
tion . 93 Yet even if (as I believe) uniform federal l aw governs the 
preclusive effects of the federal-question judgments of federal courts,94 it 
may not be inunediately obvious why uniform federal law should also 
govern the preclusive effects of state administrative proceedings determin­
ing matters of state law .  
Although at least some of the cases relied on in Elliott involved the 
creation or application of uniform federal judge-made rules of preclu­
sion,95 the Court's refusal to resort to such rules for determining whether 
Elliott's section 1983 claim was precluded is proof enough that its 
reference to "federal common-law rules of preclusion"96 was not intended 
to, or at least did not, encompass uniform preclusion rules . Put another 
way, in referring to federal common-law rules of preclusion, the Court was 
assuming a federal source of authority, not specifying a federal source of 
rules . 
Under traditional federal common-law analysis ,  the question whether 
a federal substantive claim is precluded by prior proceedings is a question 
as to which federal lawmaking competence exists no matter what the 
rendering forum, federal or state. rn Because the Court determined that 
precluding Elliott's Title VII claim98 and Solimino 's ADEA claim99 
would be inconsistent with those statutes , it was not called upon to reach 
the further question whether, if preclusion were permissible, the rules 
would be uniform federal judge-made rules or state-law rules borrowed as 
federal law. 100 
92 . Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794. 
93 . The cases cited in Elliott were: Park.lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.  322 ( 1 979); Blonder­
Tongue Lab. ,  Inc. v .  University of lll. Found. ,  402 U.S .  3 1 3  ( 1 97 1) ;  Chicot County Drainage Dist. 
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.  3 7 1  ( 1 940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S .  1 65 ( 1 93 8) ;  and Gunter v .  
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. ,  200 U.S .  273 ( 1 906) . All involved the federal-question judgments of  federal 
courts. 
94. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 762-78 .  
95 . See supra note 93 . A difficulty i n  classifying pre- 1 93 8  decisions arises from the "high degree 
of homogeneity in preclusion law throughout the country . . .  fostered by the Supreme Court's 
invocation of or reliance on 'general common law. ' "  Burbank, supra note 9, at 765 (footnote omitted) . 
96. Elliott, 478 U.S .  at 794 . 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 .  The same is true when the rendering forum is in 
another country. See infra text accompanying notes 1 93 -94. 
98 .  See supra text accompanying notes 44-47. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 . 
1 00 .  For further discussion regarding this inquiry, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. , 440 
U.S.  7 1 5 , 728-29 ( 1 979) (asserting that state law may be adopted as the federal rule of decision, but 
only after the court accounts for considerations of uniformity and also determines whether the 
application of state law would frustrate a federal program's objectives); Burbank, supra note 9, at 757-
58 (describing the two-step inquiry to determine whether to fashion a uniform federal judge-made rule 
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The same results may follow if one takes the Rules of Decision Act 
seriously and, in particular, regards it as speaking to the circumstances in 
which it is permissible for a federal court to fashion or apply federal judge­
made law. The major difference is that the Act itself is the source of 
authority to apply federal law. State preclusion law, usually the source of 
rules by reason of the Act's choice, could not preclude Elliott's Title VII 
claim or Solimino 's ADEA claim because, under the Act's exception 
clause, those statutes required otherwise. 101 In those circumstances , 
perhaps life is too short to insist on an inquiry into the precise content of 
the otherwise applicable state law _ wz 
The Court's dubious conclusion-that permitting state administrative 
proceedings to preclude Elliott's section 1 983 claim would not be 
inconsistent with that statute103-required it to proceed to the next step of 
traditional federal common-law analysis .  A paean to the benefits of giving 
preclusive effect to the adjudicative findings of an administrative agency 
might have suggested that, where the prerequisites for administrative 
preclusion under federal law announced in United States v. Utah Construc­
tion & Mining Co. 104 were met, preclusion would follow under that l aw, 
namely, as a matter of uniform federal common law. 105 But the Court 
of preclusion or whether to adopt state preclusion law as federal law) . 
1 0 1 .  I have p reviously described the weaknesses of traditional common-law analysis in light of the 
Rules of Decision Act: 
The traditional two-step inquiry is not necessary to protect federal 
interests, and it may have led to a misallocation of lawmaking within the federal 
government. If the Constitution or acts of Congress, fairly read, provide for or 
require federal common law, state law does not apply. The same is true whether 
a uniform federal rule is called for or a particular state rule is found to be hostile 
to or inconsistent with federal interests . In other cases where the Constitution does 
not so ordain, state law applies, not "of its own force" and not by judicial grace or 
borrowing, but because Congress has borrowed it. The considerations that have 
p rompted the Court to eschew independent choice of law rules in diversity cases, 
a result not required by the Constitution, are not pertinent outside that context. The 
same is true with respect to the freedom of the federal courts to determine the law 
of a particular state. 
Burbank, supra note 9, at 762 (footnotes omitted) . 
1 02 .  Cj. Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, Ala . ,  829 F.2d 1056, 1 064 ( 1 1 th  Cir. 1 987) ("At some 
point, the importance of the federal rights and limited ability of the state forum to function as final 
adjudicator of those rights would require such substantial supplemental federal preciusion requirements 
as to make resort to state preclusion rules a mere token gesture achieved at the expense of judicial 
economy. " ) .  
1 03 .  See University o f  Tenn. v.  Elliott, 4 7 8  U . S .  7 8 8 ,  796-97 ( 1 986); supra text accompanying 
notes 70-73 . 
1 0 4 .  3 8 4  U . S .  394 (1 966) . The Court stated that " [w]hen an administrative agency is acting in 
a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an 
adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose. "  
!d. a t  422. 
1 0 5 .  See Elliott, 478 U . S .  at 797-9 8 .  
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then invoked federalism values106 and held that a federal court is to "give 
the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be 
entitled in the State's courts, "107 subject to the check of the Utah 
Construction prerequisites . 108 That is , the courts should act as if the Full · 
Faith and Credit Statute did apply. Under this regime, adjudicative 
findings of a state administrative agency will be preclusive only if state law 
accords them that effect . The result is a hybrid of federal and state law · ' 
the latter specified by a uniform federal choice-of-law rule. 
Elliott can thus be seen as a case in which the Court decided that ' 
section 1738 being inapplicable, federal common law governed . But 
federal common law often borrows state law, displacing it only when 
hostile to or inconsistent with federal law. In connection with Elliott's 
section 1983 claim, the Court decided to borrow state law.  Not being 
bound by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 109 to follow 
state choice-of-law rules, and anxious to replicate the results that would 
obtain under section 1738 as closely as possible, the Court (uniformly) 
chose the domestic preclusion law of the rendering state (which may or 
may not be the state in which the federal court sits) .U0 But the Court 
also established the prerequisites for administrative preclusion under federal 
law as a uniform check on the application of state law that would 
preclude. 1 1 1  In other words, having (probably erroneously) failed to find 
a threshold barrier to the application of a (state or federal) rule of 
preclusion to Elliott's section 1983 claims , the Court turned to trans­
substantive federal preclusion law for a check. 112 
106. See id. at 798-99. 
107. ld. at 799. 
108.  ld. 
109.  3 1 3  U. S. 487, 496 (194 1 ) ;  see Burbank, supra note 9,  at 768. 
1 1 0. See Elliott, 478 U. S. at 799. In fact, the Court's formulation, see supra text accompanying 
note 107, is linguistically consistent with the interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Statute that I 
have advocated. See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 ,  55-57. As with similar formulations in cases 
interpreting § 1 73 8 ,  " [w]e can safely assume that the Court meant , . .  that the statute ' directs a federal 
court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which the [decision] was rendered. " '  Burbank, supra 
note 9, at 802 (quoting Marrese v. American Academy of Or.hopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373 ,  3 80 
(1 985)) . 
1 1 1 . See Elliott, 478 U. S. at 799. 
1 12 .  See id. at 797-98 (citing United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co. , 384 U. S. 3 94 ( 1966)). 
There is irony in calling the regime established in Utah Construction trans-substantive preclusion law, 
because the decision was very much influenced by the substantive context in which it was d ecided. See 
Utah Construction, 3 84 U. S. at 4 1 8-23 (noting that the language and policies underlying the disputes 
cLause in the contract at issue as well as the policies served by the act governing this relationship 
necessitate the holding that the Court of Claims' findings are final). "But the pull toward applying the 
same rule to different substantive contexts has been so strong that substantive concerns originally 
animating a rule are forgotten, and attempts to carve out an exception in a particular substantive context 
are vigorously resisted." Burbank, supra note i, at 1 466. 
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From the point of view of the jurisprudence of federal common law, 
-. Elliott is a fascinating case. Moreover, apart from the Court's error in 
conflating federal common-law and repeal analysis, 1 13 if one concluded 
that administrative preclusion is not always inconsistent with section 1 983,  
there would be much to be said for the Court's result .  The Full Faith and 
Credit Statute enjoins a particular kind of federalism for a particular pur­
pose. 1 14 In Elliott, that statute did not apply, but it does not hold a 
monopoly on federal ism. Both the Rules of Decision Act115 and section 
1988116-either might have been thought to apply as the source of 
authority in Elliott-look to state law as the usual source of rules. Neither 
constrains a federal court's power to choose which state's law to apply. 
More than symmetry counseled choice of the preclusion law of the 
state whose administrative tribunal rendered the decision claimed to have 
preclusive effect. Litigants should be able to know the preclusion law that 
will govern the results of l itigation because they may shape their conduct 
in l ight of it. That suggests that when a dispute is about, in the sense that 
it expressly concerns, matters of state law, and it is adjudicated in a state 
tribunal , the assumption should be that the preclusion law of that state will 
apply. 1 17 
Under the Rules of Decision Act, when state preclusion law is 
inconsistent with the pol icies of a federal statute, the federal statute 
requires that state preclusion law not apply. 1 18 This may be true not only 
of inconsistency with discrete and specifically identifiable federal statutory 
policies , but also of inconsistency with a scheme of federal substantive 
rights as a whole. 1 19 It is reason enough for concern that we put a 
congressionally created scheme of federal substantive rights at the mercy 
of federal judge-made trans-substantive preclusion rules , the content of 
which was unknown to, and unknowable by, the members of Congress who 
passed the statute. 120 It would be intolerable simply to loose on the 
1 1 3 .  See supra text accompanying notes 70-73 . 
1 1 4 .  See Burbank, supra note 9, at 739-40, 797-800. 
1 1 5 .  See supra notes 50-5 L 
1 1 6 .  42 U.S .C.  § 1988 (1 988) . For analysis of this statute, see Burbank, supra note 9, at 806..{)7, 
8 19 n.409, 822 n.427, and see generally Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: 
Some Old Light on Section 1988, 1 3 3  U. PA. L. REv. 60 1  ( 1 985) . 
1 1 7.  q. Burbank, supra note 9, at 797 (arguing that "a system of preclusion rules for diversity 
judgments keyed to the locus of subsequent litigation would be hopeless "); id. at 767 (discussing the 
administrability problems litigants would encounter if state law determined the preclusive effects of 
federal question judgments). 
1 1 8 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 0 1  . 
1 1 9 .  See Burbank, supra note 9, at 8 1 6  (arguing that "[w ]hen the Court determines that state law, 
in a domestic case, puts 'unreasonable obstacles in the way ' of a federal scheme of substantive rights, 
it applies federal common law, and it can do so in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of 
Decision Act" (quoting Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S .  22, 25 (1923)) . 
1 20 _  q. id. at 8 1 5  ("The effect of modern preclusion rules is to cut off some substantive rights 
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federal statutory scheme state preclusion rules , which are no more part of 
the federal legislative background than are federal statutes part of the 
background against which the state rules are fashioned . Elliott uses trans­
substantive federal preclusion law as a check on state preclus ion law .  This 
is a technique similar to what I have recommended elsewhere as a means 
to protect a scheme of federal rights : 
[J]ust as federal preclusion law can serve as an initial check for 
state judges alert to their duty to safeguard particular federal 
substantive policies, so may it serve as a reference when the 
concern is the effect of state law, including state preclusion law, 
on federal substantive rights . Although typically trans-substan­
tive, federal preclusion law is at least fashioned by judges 
against the background of the substantive law with which it 
interacts. When the application of state law, which is not so 
fashioned, would preclude federal substantive rights not 
precluded under federal law, further inquiry is warranted. 121 
Perhaps the most consequential of the uniform federal checks 
imposed on the application of state "administrative estoppel" in Elliott, and 
that which is of greatest interest for present purposes , is the requirement 
that "the parties have had an adequate opportunity to l itigate. " 122 In 
Utah Construction the Court elaborated on that concept as follows :  
I n  the present case the Board was acting in a judicial capacity 
when it considered the . . .  claims, the factual disputes resolved 
were clearly relevant to issues properly before it, and both 
parties had a full and fair opportunity to argue their version of 
the facts and an opportunity to seek court review of any adverse 
findings. 123 
The importance of this exception to preclusion of federal substantive rights 
by operation of state preclusion law is suggested by the fact that for a brief 
time after the Court rediscovered the Ful l  Faith and Credit Statute, it 
appeared that the exception would operate in cases to which that statute 
applied . 124 Indeed, some Justices clung to it even after its incoherence 
(as a judge-made exception to preclusion) under the Court's basic approach 
in circumstances that, had they been thinking of preclusion law, the legislators who created those rights, 
could not possibly have imagined."); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 1 3 1 ,  1 47 n .4  ( 1 988) ("The fact that 
Congress saw no need to alter these neutral procedural rules in no way suggests that all  future state­
court procedures . . .  would similarly be consistent with the purposes and intent of the federal civil 
rights Jaws . "  (emphasis in original)). 
12 1 .  Burbank, supra note 9, at 820 (final emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
122. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 ( 1 966) . 
123 .  /d. 
124. See, e.g. , Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.  90, 1 0 1  ( 1 980) . 
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to the statute (positing a congressional choice of state preclusion law) 
should have been clear . 125 
No "further inquiry" 126 should be necessary to prevent the applica­
tion of state preclusion law that would foreclose the assertion of federal 
substantive rights as a result of state administrative proceedings in which 
the party asserting those rights lacked, according to federal standards, a full 
and fair opportunity to l itigate. The Rules of Decision Act should not be 
interpreted " in a crabbed or wooden fashion . " 127 And if we do not so 
interpret it, the federal statute under which the rights are asserted requires 
otherwise than that the state preclusion rule apply. 
In cases following Elliott the hardest task may be to persuade the 
court that "an adequate opportunity to litigate" or a "full and fair 
opportunity" to l itigate includes more than is minimally required by due 
process . 128 The Court in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. 
equated the two, but it did so in response to the (erroneous) view that 
section 1738 chooses domestic state preclusion law, a congressional choice 
that would be binding unless unconstitutional or superseded by another 
legislative choice (i. e. , repeal) . 129 In cases l ike Elliott, section 1738 does 
not apply, and the plaintiff should seek all of the protections of trans­
substantive federal preclusion law, which draws heavily on the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments . 130  Of course, defendants will urge the court to 
follow Kremer in this aspect .131 
IV. Federal Judgments Law in International Cases 
A.  Sources of Authority in  General 
Although neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution nor its implementing statute applies to the judgments of 
foreign tribunals,132 there can be no doubt about the existence of federal 
lawmaking competence to define the circumstances in which, and the 
criteria by which , foreign judgments will be recognized and enforced in 
this country. Legislative competence may be found in Congress's power 
1 25. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S .  306, 3 1 3  (1 983); Burbank, supra note 9, at 8 1 4. 
1 26. See supra text accompanying note 1 2 1 .  
1 27. Robertson v .  Wegmann, 436 U .S. 584, 598 (1 978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
128.  See Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 651 F. Supp. 1 225, 1 230 (S .D.N.Y.), aff'd, 828 F.2d 1 04 
(2d Cir. 1 987); infra note 1 3 1 .  
1 29. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S .  461 , 480-82 ( 1 982). 
130 .  See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 3 30-3 1 nn. 13- 16  ( 1 979). 
1 3 1 .  Plaintiffs are not immune to confusion on this score, with predictably bad effects. See Layne 
v. Campbell County Dep't of Social Servs. ,  939 F.2d 2 1 7 ,  2 1 9-20 (4th Cir. 1 99 1 )  (upholding dismissal 
of the claims of a plaintiff who mistakenly equated adequate opportunity to litigate with due process) . 
1 32 .  The Full Faith and Credit Clause is restricted to "the Judicial Proceedings of every other 
State. "  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. The statute is restricted to "judicial proceedings of any court of any 
such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1 738  ( 1 988). 
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to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"133 or to "make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution "134 the 
Executive's powers in the conduct of foreign affairs . 135 Congress 
rarely exercised its power in this domain, however. Indeed, perhaps the' 
most prominent example of legislation in the area is the amendments to the · 
Federal Arbitration Act136 enacted in aid of the Convention on the · 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards , popularly . 
referred to as the New York Convention.137 
In default of federal legislation, much of the energy to create 
uniform federal law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign-court 
judgments has centered on treaties . The United States, however, is not 
now a party to any unilateral or bilateral conventions dealing expressly · 
with that subject. 138 At least for a time, this was not for lack of effort. 
Particularly when it became clear how badly U.S .  nationals might fare as 
a result of discriminatory recognition provisions agreed to in the Brussels 
Convention139 by the members of the European Economic Community, 
we sought to take advantage of the opportunity to escape those provisions 
by negotiating bilateral conventions . 140 The effort started and ended with 
the United Kingdom141-from a comparative-law perspective our most 
l ikely treaty partner. The enterprise seems to have foundered largely on 
disagreements about both legislative jurisdiction (particularly the extraterri-
1 3 3 .  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.  3 .  
134 .  Id. art. I ,  § 8 ,  cl.  1 8 .  
1 3 5 .  See id. art. II ,  § 2 ;  cf. Verlinden B.V.  v .  Central Bank of Nigeria, 4 6 1  U.S.  480, 493 ( 1 983) 
("By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, Congress has the undisputed 
power to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under what circumsumces foreign nations 
should be amenable to suit in the United States . ") .  
1 3 6 .  Pub. L .  N o .  9 1-368, § 1 ,  8 4  Stat. 692 (codified a t  9 U.S.C. § §  1 - 1 4  ( 1 988)). 
137. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1 958, 
21  U.S .T. 25 17, 494 U . N .T.S. 321 [hereinafter New York Convention] . 
1 3 8 .  See BORN & WESTIN,  supra note 1 ,  at 564; EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 24.39 ( 1 982); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of United States Judgments Abroad and 
Foreign Judgments in the United States : Would International Conventions be U seful? 4-6 (Apr. 1 9 9 1) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Texas Law Review) . 
1 3 9 .  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 1 972 J .O.  (L 299) 32. 
140 .  See PETER BYRNE, THE EEC CONVENTION ON JURJSDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS 26-27, 1 78-79 (1 990); Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the 
United States, 1 7  VA. J. INT'L L .  40 1 ,  4 1 3 - 1 4  (1 977); Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Common Market 
Judgments Convention and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L .  
REV. 1282, 1289-9 1 ( 1969) . 
1 4 1 .  See Mary A. Alford, Comment, The Effect of the Proposed U. S. -U.K. Reciprocal 
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments Treaty on Current Recognition Practice in the United 
States, 1 8  COLUM.  J. TRANSNAT'L  L. 1 1 9 ,  1 1 9 ( 1 979) (noting that the proposed recognition treaty was 
the first of its kind for the U.S.);  see generally Hans Smit, The Proposed United States- United 
Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Prototype for the Future ? 1 7  
VA. J .  lNT'L L .  443 (1 977) . 
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torial reach of United States antitrust law), and adjudicatory jurisdiction 
(particularly in product liabil ity cases) . 142 
Although obviously an occasion for discouragement, the failure to 
conclude a treaty with the United Kingdom143 is not grounds for despair. 
The incentives for a renewed effort have increased with the extension of 
the Brussels Convention to the member states of the European Free Trade 
Association. 144 A recent paper by Professor von Mehren suggests that 
revisiting the subject may lead to fruitful avenues of compromise. 145 The 
main question may, therefore, be one of political will . 
In the absence of federal legislation and treaties , the only possible 
foundation for a federal solution to the problems of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is federal common law . 146 And, 
indeed, some commentators have suggested that the political will needed 
might be furnished by the federal judiciary. 147 In arguing for uniform 
judge-made rules, these commentators have, I believe, both misappre­
hended the nature of the problem and miscalculated the power of the 
federal courts to solve it. 
1 42 .  See P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 Nw. 
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 2 1 9 ,  228-39 ( 1 979) . 
1 43 .  See von Mehren, supra note 1 40 ,  at 4 1 3  (noting that, although initialed, the U.S.-U.K. 
Convention had not been submitted to the Senate for ratification) . 
1 44 .  See BYRNE, supra note 1 40,  at 8; Michael J. Bonell, Harmonization of Law Between Civil 
and Common Law Jurisdictions: The 1968 Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention-An 
Example to Follow, in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XffiTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 70, 85-86 ( 1990). 
1 45 .  See von Mehren, supra note 1 3 8 ,  at 1 4- 1 9; see also Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of 
Foreign-Money Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 , 327-28 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .  Professor Brand makes the interesting point that 
changes in the nature of international arbitration, procedural and substantive, coupled with experience 
under the New York Convention, see supra text accompanying note 1 37,  may have improved the 
climate for a multilateral treaty. See Brand, supra, at 292-95. He also notes changes in attitudes 
towards the extraterritorial application of U.S.  laws. See id. at 295-96. 
1 4 6 .  Professor Brand's recent suggestion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could provide 
uniform federal law on this subject for the federal courts, see Brand, supra note 145,  at 3 1 9-22, is a 
non-starter. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.  § 2072 ( 1 988) , does not authorize rules of this type. 
See Burbank, supra note 9, at 772-73 . 
1 47 .  See, e.g. , Brand, supra note 1 45 ,  at 300- 1 8 ;  John N .  Moore, Federalism and Foreign 
Relations, 1 965 DUKE L.J.  248 , 261 -68, 285-86; Willis L . M .  Reese, The Status in This Country of 
Judgments Rendered A broad, 50 COLUM. L. REv . 783 , 786-38 ( 1 950); Eugene F.  Scoles, Interstate 
and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV . 1 599, 1 602..{)7 
( 1 966); John D. Brununett, Jr. , Note, T1ze Preclusive Effect of Foreign-Country Judgments in the 
United States and Federal Choice of Law: The Role of the Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N .Y.L.  ScH. 
L. REV. 83, 1 09 ( 1 988); Albert A .  Lindner, Comment, Judgments Rendered Abroad-State Law or 
Federal Law?, 1 2  VILL. L .  REv. 6 1 8 , 630 ( 1 967); Raymond P. Marks, Note, Alternative Theories for 
Establishing a Federal Common Law of Foreign Judgments in Commercial Cases: The Foreign Affairs 
Power and the Donnant Foreign Commerce Clause, 1 6  VA. J. INT'L L. 635, 660 ( 1 976) . 
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B. Federal Common Law: Practical Considerations 
[Vol .  70: 155 1  ' 
Hilton v. Guyot148 represents the best of federal general common 
law, if not of opinion-writing. Here, after all ,  was the Supreme Court, in 
an exhaustive (and exhaustingY49 opinion that collected authority 
wherever it might be found, settling a question that had vexed our courts 
for decades-indeed, since we became a country : what, if any, respect is 
due the judicial proceedings of the courts of another country? 
And, length and prolixity aside, what a grand statement the Court's 
opinion in Hilton was . The modern reader may remember only the 
requirement of reciprocity-do unto others as they would do unto you . Yet 
even as to that, the Court was less grudging than is sometimes recog­
nized . 150 Putting reciprocity to the side, the Court in Hilton-in 1 895 be 
it recalled-essentially said that foreign judgments should be treated as if 
they issued from courts of neighboring states-as if they were entitled to 
full faith and credit . 151 
Did I say that Hilton v. Guyot settled the question of the respect due 
to foreign judgments? That is notoriously not true as to sources of 
authority. 152 But the case has been a fertile source of rules, leading to 
the substantial measure of uniformity153 that was the great hope, oft 
defeated, of the author of Swift v. Tyson. 154 For Hilton was decided in 
what Paul Freund called "that spacious era before the Erie case, when 
federal judges in diversity cases were more than echoes of half-heard 
whispers of the state tribunals .  " 155 S ince Erie ushered in dual revolu-
1 4 8 .  159 u.s. 1 1 3 (1 895) . 
149.  The statement of the case occupies more than nine pages, id. at 1 14-23 , the arguments of 
counsel some forty pages, id. at 1 23 -62, the Court's opinion sixty-seven pages, id. at 1 62-229, and the 
dissent a mere six pages, id. at 229-34. 
1 50 .  See id. at 2 1 0-29; Reese, supra note 1 47 ,  at 790-92 . 
1 5 1 . See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What 
to Do About It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236, 240-4 1 ( 1 957) . 
152.  See Reese, supra note 1 47,  at 786-88 .  
! 5 3 .  See BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 1 ,  at 565 (noting that " [m]ost state courts have adopted the 
basic approach to foreign judgments taken almost a century ago in Hilton v. Guyot"); R. Doak Bishop 
& Susan Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16 lNT'L 
LAW. 425, 430 ( 1 982) (noting that "the Hilton language still remains the predominant statement of the 
elements which must ex.ist before a foreign-country judgment will be re�,;ognized in the U nited States"); 
Brand, supra note 145, at 261 -62, 265-66 (noting extensive reliance on Hilton in decisions, statutes, 
and Restatements) . Compare von Mehren, supra note 1 3 8 ,  at 1 1  (observing the "substantial unity that, 
despite its federal character, United States recognition practice today exhibits") with id. at 9 (stating 
that "the Jaw of recognition and enforcement varies in significant details from state to state" (footnote 
omitted)) . 
154.  41 U.S.  ( 1 6  Pet.) I (1 842) (Story, J.) ;  see also Erie R.R.  v. Tompkins, 304 U . S .  64, 74 
( 1 93 8) ("Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had revealed its defects, political and 
social;  and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue. ") . 
1 5 5 .  Paul A. F;eund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of lAws, 59 HARV. L .  REv. 1 2 10,  ! 2 1 2  
(1 946) . 
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tions/56 there has been near unanimity among courts that, in the absence 
of a treaty or federal statute, the states are free to define for themselves the 
standards to use in recognizing foreign judgments , and that federal courts 
sitting to administer state law in diversity are bound to follow those stan­
dards . 157 In doing so, however, whether in cases or statutes, the states 
have largely adopted the basic rules announced in Hilton, except that most 
of them have refused to follow the requirement of reciprocity. 158 I 
believe that the resulting relatively high degree of homogeneity in 
fundamental domestic rules helps explain why arguments by commentators 
favoring uniform and uniformly applicable federal rules159 have fared so 
poorly. Thus, as a relic of general federal common law Hilton may also 
be a derelict, 160 but it is a relatively harmless one. The main problem 
posed by our law of recognition in international cases may not be content 
but form, and the main problem of national interest in such cases may not 
in any event be our law of recognition. 
It is one thing to conclude from an analysis of the relevant legal 
materials that United States law is substantially uniform in fundamental 
rules and quite another to persuade a foreign court seeking to apply a 
reciprocity requirement of the truth of that proposition, or for that matter 
of any other proposition about law found in cases . 161 We should not be 
so far removed from our own debates about codification of the law162 that 
we cannot understand the skepticism of courts accustomed to codified law 
when confronted with arguments �as�gn case law from one of fifty-one 
lawmaking jurisdictions . Indeed, we are not so far removed, for percep-
1 56 .  See Henry J.  Friendly, In Praise ofErie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 3 8 3 ,  422 (1 964) ("The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow state 
decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas state courts must 
follow federal decisions on subjects within national legislative power where congress has so d irected­
seems so beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why a century and a half 
were needed to discover them . . . . ") . 
1 57 .  See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 48 1 
cmt. a ( 1 987) ("Thus, State courts, and federal courts applying State law, recognize and enforce foreign 
country judgments without reference to federal rules . ") .  
1 5 8 .  See id. § 48 1 cmt. d (observing that the reciprocity requirement " i s  n o  longer followed in 
the great majority of state and federal courts in the United States");  Frederich K. Juenger, The 
Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM . J. COMP. L. 1 ,  33 ( 1988) 
(noting that the rule of reciprocity announced in Hilton v. Guyot "is becoming obsolete") .  The 
rejection of reciprocity, however. has not been universa l .  See Brand, supra note 145, at 263-65. 
! 59 .  See supra note 1 47 and accompanying text. 
1 60 .  See supra text accompanying notes 27-2 8 .  
1 6 1 .  See Brand, supra note 1 45 ,  a t  256 ,  287; Adolph Hamburger, Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments: A New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 1 8  AM . J. COMP. L. 367, 369-70 
( 1 970) ; Nadelmann, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 25 1 -57;  Behrooz Moghaddam, Note, Recognition of Foreign 
Country Judgments-A Case for Federalization, 22 TEX. lNT' L  L. J. 33 1 ,  346 ( 1 987) . 
1 62 .  See generally Cf.L>\RLES M .  COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (198 1 ) .  
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tion of the problem was an important influence in the movement for 
uniform state recognition and enforcement legislation. 163 
The inadequacy of uniform federal judge-made rules in this area 
would not be l imited to matters of form.164 As this country's experience 
in attempting to work out an acceptable treaty with the United Kingdom 
demonstrates, even countries sharing a legal tradition can be deeply divided 
on matters of legislative jurisdiction and substantive policy, and these 
divisions, as well as differences concerning standards of adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, can prevent accord on standards for recognition and enforce­
ment. 165 Uniform domestic law could not bridge those divides unless it 
waved a white flag of surrender166 or were the product of an international 
lawmaking effort capable of forging compromises in a way that unilateral 
lawmaking is not . 167 
The widespread rejection of reciprocity in this country since Hilton 
v. Guyot may reflect the perceived institutional incapacity of courts to 
engage in the sort of give and take that will be necessary to solve the 
problems of judgment recognition and enforcement in international 
cases . 168 And from that perspective, there is irony in reliance on the 
decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatind69 by those who 
1 63 .  See Hamburger, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 3 69;  Barbara Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country 
Judgments in New York: The Unifonn Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 1 8  BUFF. L. REv. 
1 ,  1 ( 1969); Nadelmann, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 258-59.  Unfortunately, substantial u niformity has eluded 
u s .  See Brand, supra note 1 45 ,  at 283 . 
1 64 .  To be sure, uniform case law would be better than nonuniform case law. See von Mehren, 
supra note 1 40, at 408 .  
1 6 5 .  See Nadel mann, supra note 1 5 1 ,  a t  260-62; supra text accompanying notes 1 4 1 -42; cf. 
Burbank, supra note 1 ,  at 1 465-66 ("In many cases, the real problems are not those of legislative 
jurisdiction; they are problems involving disagreement on matters of substantive law and state policy . " ) .  
1 66.  Complete surrender would be impossible if, for instance, recognition a n d  enforcement o f  a 
foreign judgment would violate due process. See Reese, supra note 1 47 ,  at 796; von Mehren, supra 
note 1 3 8 ,  at 1 5 .  Moreover, surrender on standards of recognition and enforcement would likely result 
in a lowest common denominator, the uniformity of which being the best thing one could say about it. 
1 67 .  See Burbank, supra note 1 ,  at 1 496. 
1 68 .  See Hilton v. Guyot, 1 59 U.S.  1 1 3 ,  234 ( 1 895) ( Fuller, C .J . ,  dissenting) ( " [I]t is for the 
government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed under any 
circumstances desirable or necessary.");  cf. Patrick J. Borchers, Professor Brilmayer and the Holy 
Grail, 1 99 1  WIS. L .  REv. 465, 480 (reviewing LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF  LAWS: FOUNDATIONS 
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ( 1 99 1)) (" 'Tit for Tat' may be an acceptable game strategy, but it hardly 
seems like a way to decide real lawsuits involving real parties. Certainly it is not likely to inspire 
public confidence in the courts.");  Burbank, supra note 1 ,  at 1 480 (noting the danger that a court 
interpreting a treaty will "compromise the ability of those primarily charged with the conduct of foreign 
relations effectively to implement our national interests through dialogue wit.'1 other nations") ; Laker 
Airways Ltd . v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 73 1 F.2d 9{)9, 948-52 (D. C .  Cir. 1 984) (rejecting 
interest balancing in determining prescriptive jurisdiction) . But see Moore, supra note 1 47 ,  at 255-56 
(arguing that state rej ections of reciprocity lead to the result that "judgments of other nations are largely 
enforced in this countr;, while our judgments are not enforced in foreign courts") . 
1 69 .  376 u.s.  3 98 ( 1964). 
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advocate uniform federal judge-made rules . 17° For Sabbatino is best 
regarded not as authority for an expansive federal common law of foreign 
affairs but rather for the power of the federal judiciary to make uniformly 
applicable rules (the act-of-state doctrine) designed to protect courts from 
entanglements in, and interbranch conflicts about, matters for which they 
are not institutionally suited . 171 Indeed, the Court in Sabbatino also 
refused to extend the reciprocity of Hilton v. Guyot "to the question of 
standing of sovereign states to sue, "172 observing that courts' "powers to 
further the national interest in foreign affairs are necessarily circumscribed 
as compared with those of the political branches . "173 
C. Federal Common Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules 
How far, then, could federal common law extend in governing the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments? The broadest sweep for 
federal judge-made law would involve uniform rules binding in all cases 
in federal and state court alike. The narrowest would find state law 
governing in all cases , no matter what the court, except where a particular 
state rule was recognized to be hostile to or inconsistent with federal 
interests . The former is too broad and the latter too narrow. The truth lies 
somewhere in the middle, very close to what I take to be the law today. 
I have already suggested a difficulty in regarding Sabbatino as 
authority for an expansive federal common law of foreign affairs.174 It 
is not that the Court eschewed the most obvious peg upon which to hang 
federal judicial authority when it denied that the act-of-state doctrine was 
required by the "text of the Constitution. "175 The Court seems there to 
have been denying that the Constitution was the source of a particular rule 
("irrevocably remov[ing] from the judiciary the capacity to review the 
1 70 .  See Moore, supra note 1 47 ,  at 269-70, 273-75. 
1 7 1 .  See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424-25; Louis Henkin, The Foreign Af airs Power of the Federal 
Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805, 8 1 4- 1 9 ,  830-32 ( 1964); see also Alfred Hill, The lAw­
Making Power of the Federal Couns: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1 024, 1056-57, 
1 064 n . l 94 (1 967) (suggesting that avoiding exacerbation of foreign relations is a basis for federal 
judicial control, but that policy alone is too broad and vague to define the range of exclusive federal 
competence) ; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Act of State and Depanment of State: First National City Bank 
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 ( 1 972) (� [W]hen the judiciary of its own accord 
sets limits to its adjudicatory role, neither of the other branches of government-let alone both-should 
try to expand those limits . ") .  For recent criticism of Sabbatino's restraint, see Harold H. Koh, 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2362-64, 2377 (1991) .  
1 72 .  Sabbatino, 376 U.S.  at  4 1 2 .  
1 7 3 .  !d. 
1 7 4 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 7 1 . 
1 75 .  Sabbatino, 376 U.S.  at 423 . Specifically, the Court held that "the text of the Constitution 
does not require L�e act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity 
to review the valid it; of foreign acts of state. "  !d. 
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validity of foreign acts of state"176) , not that it was a source of authority 
for judge-made law . 177 Even if, however, the Constitution plausibly 
requires uniformity as to acts of state, a doctrine described by the Court in 
Sabbatino as "concern[ing] the competency of dissimilar institutions to 
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of inter­
national relations , " 178 the requirement of uniformity does not auto­
matically extend to other areas in which " international relations" may be 
implicated . 179 Other Supreme Court decisions that tend to be cited in 
support of broad common-law powers are even less helpful , either because 
they involved past federal executive action with which state law could be 
deemed inconsistene80 or because state law, on its face or as applied, was 
so intrusive as to threaten the future abil ity of the federal executive to 
perform its constitutional functions properly. 181 
Because the fundamental rules in most states, judge-made or 
statutory, derive from Hilton v. Guyot, 182 if there are serious risks of 
1 76. !d. 
1 77 .  See id. ("The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional' underpinnings .") ;  id. 
at 427 & n.25 (noting that various provisions of the Constitution support determining the scope of the 
act-of-state doctrine according to federal law by "reflecting a concern for uniformity" in foreign 
relations and " indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of 
federal institutions"). 
1 7 8 .  !d. at 423 . In fact, the Court left open "whether a state court might, in  certain circumstanc­
es, adhere to a more restrictive view concerning the scope of examination of foreign acts than that 
required by this Court." !d. at 425 n.23 . 
1 79. In asserting, as well as denying, federal authority, we should not address "a valid concern" 
with "an overcompensating blanket rule." Koh, supra note 1 7 1 ,  at 2382. 
1 80 .  See United States v. Pink, 3 1 5  U.S. 203 , 223 ( 1 942); United States v .  Belmont, 3 0 1  U . S .  
324, 3 2 7  (1 937) (both holding that a n  agreement between t h e  Soviet Union a n d  the United States, i n  
which all claims held b y  the Soviet Union against American nationals were assigned t o  the United 
States, could not be infringed upon by any policy of the State of New York because "no state policy 
can prevail against the international compact here involved" ) .  
1 8 1 .  See Zschernig v .  Miller, 389 U . S .  429, 441 ( 1 968) (holding a n  Oregon probate law that 
provided for " escheat where a nonresident alien claims personalty unless . . .  there is a reciprocal right 
of a United States citizen to take property on the same terms as the citizen in a foreign nation" 
unconstirutional as applied because "it has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well 
adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with . . .  them"). As Justice Harlan, 
autlwr of the Court's opinion in Sabbatino, observed in his concurring opinion in Zschemig: 
If the flaw in the statute is said to be that it requires state courts to inquire 
into the administration of foreign law, I would suggest that that characteristic is 
shared by other legal rules which I cannot believe the Court wishes to invalidate. 
For example, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides that 
a foreign-country money judgment shall not be recognized if it �was rendered under 
a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with 
the requirements of due process of law . "  
!d. a t  461 ('rtarlan, J. , concurring). For an argument that "Zschemig's incompleteness is n o  reason 
for converting its curb on state law into a presumption in favor of federal law , "  see James A.R.  
Nafziger, State Law in lntenUJtional Cases, in 1 990 AJ..! .  Soc'Y L'lT'L L. PROC. 332, 335.  For a 
penetrating analysis of Zschemig, see Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common LAw 
in Private lntenUJtional Matters, 5 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 3 3  (1971) .  
1 82 .  1 59 U . S .  1 1 3 ( 1 895) . See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 3 ,  !58.  
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disruption, they l ikely have a federal Gudicial) source. Moreover, as 
others have observed, 183 the lead candidate for federal displacement 
would be the requirement of reciprocity that most states have already re­
jected . 184 Other inquiries under state recognition law that could prove 
embarrassing in the conduct of the nation's foreign relations seem rarely, 
if ever, of consequence. 185 
Thus , assuming that the Constitution's foreign relations or foreign 
trade powers, without more, could ground uniform judge-made rules of 
recognition and enforcement, 1 86 a showing could not be made, at least 
under most of the Court's recent federal common-law decisions,187 to 
support uniform rules as opposed to state law borrowed as federal law 
except where hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests . 188 
The power to displace state law rules exists in cases brought in both 
federal and state court, although, as we have seen, it is hard to speak of the 
state law rules of recognition and enforcement that are normally applicable 
in state court as "really federal law. " 189 Under an approach to federal 
common law that takes the Rules of Decision Act seriously, the difficulty 
w ith the notion of judicial borrowing is no less in cases brought in federal 
court, where that statute cannot simply be wished away. 1ro 
If that were all ,  we would be left with the federal common-law 
regime of narrowest scope described above. 191 But that is not all , or so 
1 8 3 .  See, e .g. , Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 37,  48 n.55 ( 1 974) ; 
Hamburger, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 3 8 1 -9 1 . 
1 84 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 5 8 .  For expressed doubt that Zschemig even requires 
states to abandon reciprocity, let alone to apply federal law, see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1 3 8 ,  
§ 2 4 . 3 5 ,  a t  964-65 n . 5 .  
1 8 5 .  See Brand, supra note 1 45 ,  a t  275 (noting that considerations o f  public policy may, b u t  rarely 
do, result in denial of recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments); Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 ,  at 
22-23 (discussing the difficulty of determining when a state may legitimately refuse to recognize a 
foreign judgment because it conflicts with important forum policies) ; id. at 36-37 (discussing judgments 
from biased tribunals and procedures incompatible with due process) . 
1 8 6 .  See generally Maier, supra note 1 8 1 ;  Hill, supra note 1 7 1 .  
1 8 7 .  See, e.g. , United States v .  Kimbell Foods, Inc . ,  44() U . S .  7 1 5  ( 1 979) . But see Boyle v.  
United Technologies Corp . ,  487 U . S .  500, 504 (1 988) (holding in a diversity case involving uniquely 
federal interests that state Jaw is preempted and replaced by federal common law, absent explicit 
statutory directive) . It is difficult for me to regard Boyle as signaling a general shift back to the 
expansive approach to federal common law typified by Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 3 1 8  U . S .  
363 , 366-67 ( 1943) . See Burbank, supra note 9, a t  758 .  The opinions reek o f  teleology. See The 
Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HAR.v. L. REV. 143,  288-97 ( 1 988) . 
1 88 .  This is essentially the conclusion reached by Professor Peterson in a thoughtful a rticl e .  See 
Courtland H .  Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of lAws, 
72 COLUM .  L. REv. 220, 234-38 ( 1 972); see also Homer D. Schaaf, The Recognition of Judgments 
from Foreign Countries: A Federal-State Clause for an International Convention, 3 HA.'<.V . J. ON LEGIS. 
379, 395-98 (1965-66) (discussing the reluctance of federal courts to develop federal common law in 
the absence of a statutory or constitutional basis for doing so) . 
1 8 9 .  See supra text accompanying note 53 . 
1 90. See supra text accompanying notes 5 1 -53 . 
1 9 1 . See supra paragraph preceding note 1 74 .  
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courts and commentators seem to think, without bothering to explain why. 
In cases involving the recognition of foreign judgments that are both 
brought in federal court and brought under federal substantive law, the 
tendency has been to look directly to federal law, or at least not to mention 
state law . 192 
As we have seen, under traditional federal common-law analysis, the 
question whether a federal substantive claim is precluded by prior 
proceedings is a question as to which federal lawmaking competence exists 
no matter what the rendering forum. 193 This includes a foreign forum.  
I t  would be  ironic to invoke the homogeneity of  domestic law in this area 
as an argument against the use of uniform federal judge-made rules in 
federal question cases . For it  was , I have argued, the existence of such 
uniform judge-made rules , albeit in different garb, that l argely explains the 
current state of recognition law . 194 Indeed, the substantial s imilarity of 
federal and state rules to determine the preclusive effects of foreign 
judgments seems instead an argument for permitting the federal courts, in 
federal question cases, to protect federal interests directly. State interests 
are negligible, and the administrability costs inherent in references to state 
law, including those associated with the selection of the state whose law 
was to be borrowed, would be difficult to justify. 195 
Moreover, it may not be inappropriate to consider that, in addition 
to protecting federal interests that underlie the particular substantive scheme 
in suit, uniform federal rules of recognition and enforcement could 
safeguard the general federal interests in foreign affairs and foreign trade. 
Particularly because " it is not clear that the uniformity inquiry need, or that 
it should, be cabined by existing . . .  law, " 196 we are perhaps entitled to 
rely on the general proposition that federal law is better calculated than 
state law to protect federal interests , 197 or at least to do so when multiple 
federal , and few discernible state, interests are implicated . 
1 92.  See 1 8  CHARLES A. WRJGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4473 ( 1981)  
("In deciding federal question cases, there is  no apparent reason to  consult state law and fed eral courts 
routinely determine the res judicata effects of foreign judgments without any reference to state law. "); 
see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 1 83 ,  at 39 ("If the issue to which a foreign judgment 
relates is a federal question . . .  the court . . .  would apply federal law . . . .  ") ;  Eric D. Ram, Note, 
Reciprocal Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments: The Canada-United States Example, 45 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 456, 1 48 1  (1 977) ("If the recognition [of a foreign judgment] claim is ancillary 
to one involving a federal question . . .  the suit upon the judgment will be decided according to federal 
common law.") .  
1 93 .  See supra text accompanying note 97. 
194.  See Burbank, supra note 9 ,  at 769 & n. l 68 ;  supra text accompanying notes 1 52-55, 158-60. 
195 .  Cf. Burbank, supra note 9 ,  at 765-70 (describing costs that would be incurred if uniform 
federal preclusion rules for federal question judgments of federal courts were not adopted) . I reach a 
different conclusion as to the governing law in a state-court action on a federal claim. See supra text 
accompanying note 3 1 .  
196.  Burban.�, supra note 9 ,  at 770 n . 1 72. 
197 . Cf supra text accompanying notes 1 1 9-21 .  
\ 
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Such reliance is, of course, more problematic under an approach to 
federal common law that takes the Rules of Decision Act seriously. Yet, 
to recur to the distinction suggested by Sabbatino/98 that statute need 
not, and should not, be "interpreted to require that the precise content, 
rather than the creation, of uniform federal common law rules be 'required' 
by the Constitution or acts of Congress .  "199 On the assumption of con­
tinuing substantial homogeneity as between federal and state recognition 
law, the administrability costs of reference to state law might be thought 
too high to justify "distinguishing between federal law on the front l ines 
and federal law held in reserve. "200 If, on the contrary, the analysis 
contemplates either existing differences or possible changes in the law of 
recognition and enforcement, federal or state, the costs of applying state 
law would more often include the possible loss of federal substantive rights 
and thus justify a conclusion that the federal substantive statute requires the 
appl ication of uniform federal recognition law .  
The case for the application of  federal judge-made rules of  
recognition and enforcement to foreign judgments i s  hardly watertight even 
when the issue arises in a federal question case in federal court .201 It 
crumbles to dust when the case is instead a state-law diversity action. State 
interests are directly impl icated, 202 as is the articulated federal interest 
against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship in diversity cases . 203 
Differences between state and federal law on the recognition and enforce­
ment of foreign judgments could easily and materially affect "the character 
or result of the litigation . "204 Moreover, such differences would be 
l ikely to affect choice of forum, whether or not they could be characterized 
as " inequitable administration of the laws . "205 It appears that, according 
to the Hanna test, state law should be applied to foreign judgments in 
diversity cases . Even if the Supreme Court's approach to these problems 
still permits the consideration of other federal interests,206 it is not clear 
how they could tip the balance in favor of federal law. For as we have 
1 98 .  376 U.S.  398 ( 1964); see supra text accompany ing notes 175-7 8 .  
1 99 .  Burbank, supra note 9 ,  a t  770. 
200 . Id. at 765 . I use the term " federal law-in-reserve" to describe federal law that " act[s] only 
as a check against hostile or inconsistent state law." Id. at 764. 
20 1 .  Obviously, I do not share the view, which the Rules of Decision Act renders incoherent, that 
in federal question cases "there is no apparent reason to consult state law . "  See 1 8  WRIGHT ET AL . ,  
supra note 1 92, § 4473 . 
202. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 784 ("[W ]hereas in federal question cases state substantive 
interests are usually contingent, in diversity cases, assuming the action involves the adjudication of 
rights under state substantive law, state interests are directly and inescapably implicated . "). 
203 . See, e .g. , W alker v .  Armco Steel Corp.,  446 U.S .  740, 744-47 ( 1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S.  460, 466-69 ( 1965) . 
204. Hanna, 380 U.S .  at 468 n .9 .  
205 . Id. a t  468;  see Burbank, supra note 9, a t  785 .  
206. See Burbank, supra note 9, a t  788-9 1 . 
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seen, the general federal interest in foreign affairs or foreign trade is not 
sufficient to require uniform federal rules .207 In sum, Hilton v. Guyot 
might be decided the same way in 1 995 as it was in 1 895-although that 
seems unlikely with respect to the question of reciprocity208-but not 
because it reflects an enduring source of authority. 209 
D. Legal Sources: Additional Complexities 
Whatever the governing recognition law in our courts , federal or 
state, and whatever the source of the rules provided by that law,  the rules 
themselves may, at key points , require reference to foreign law .  The 
extent to which such references are appropriate is a difficult issue, but one 
that has occupied scholars more than courts .210 The same is true regard­
ing the issue of exactly what law or standards should be consulted when a 
reference to "domestic law" is required or appropriate. 21 1 Treaties could 
answer these questions , but we should not hold our breath . 212 I conclude 
by offering a few preliminary thoughts about this last interesting but 
relatively neglected set of questions . 
Much ink has been spil led on the reasons for recognizing and 
enforcing foreign judgments .213 At various times in our history, lacking 
direction from positive law, courts have sought to justify their positions in 
the felt necessities of conflicts theory or in the mists of comity.214 More 
recently, commentators have focused attention on the relevance to foreign 
judgment recognition practice of the policies underlying domestic law.215 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 1 74-90 . 
208 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 6 8 .  
209. Reciprocity aside, Hilton might b e  decided the same way in 1 995 because the 1 895 decision 
has proved such a "fertile source of rules" for the states. See supra text accompanying note 1 53 .  State 
law would now be applicable under the Rules of Decision Act. 
2 1 0 .  See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgmems: Whose Law?, 70 
IOWA L. REv. 53 , 54-58 (1 984); Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 ,  at 1 4- 1 8 ,  20-2 1 ;  Peterson, supra note 1 88 ,  
a t  259-64; Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A 
Survey and Suggested Approach, 8 1  HARV. L. REv. 1 60 1 ,  1 6 1 1 -24, 1 673-95 ( 1 968) . 
2 1 1 .  See Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 ,  at 1 5  (describing the "mirror-image principle , "  under which 
"countries measure[] the foreign court's j urisdiction by reference to the bases found in their own 
laws"). 
2 1 2 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 3 8-45 . 
2 1 3 .  See, e.g. , Casad, supra note 2 1 0 ,  at 58-6 1 ;  Peterson, supra note 1 8 3 ,  at 23 9-48; Courtland 
H. Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 1 ,  299-308 ( 1 963);  
Reese, supra note 1 47,  at 783-86;  Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in 
the United States, 9 UCLA L. REv. 44, 52-56 (1 962) ; von Mehren & Trautman ,  supra note 2 1 0 ,  at 
1 602-06 . 
2 1 4 .  See Reese, supra note 1 47,  at 784 (noting that the doctrine of "comityn is often used by 
American courts to justifY recognition of foreign judgments while English courts prefer the doctrine 
of "legal obligations of foreign judgments"); Smit, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 52-55 (observing tl1at comity has 
been invoked frequently because of its convenient vagueness). 
2 1 5 .  See Smit, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 56; Reese, supra note 1 47, at 784. 
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Major differences of opinion have emerged depending upon whether those 
policies are not only weighed, but also defined, from an interjurisdictional 
perspective, or in other words , whether the relevant "domestic law "  is that 
governing intrastate cases or that governing interstate cases . 216 
Granting the inadequate explanatory power of comity,217 it does 
suggest a policy of accommodation. We may be required to re-rationalize 
Hilton v. Guyot,218 but we are probably not free to ignore it. The 
advancement of intramural preclusion policies did not exhaust the Supreme 
Court's agenda in that case,219 and, reciprocity aside, it is difficult to 
believe that the Court would stop there today.220 More generally, it 
hardly seems a plausible normative posture today that "the principles 
underlying the doctrine of res judicata provide the only logical and 
satisfactory explanation for recognition of foreign judgments . "221 
2 1 6 .  Compare Smit, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 56 (rejecting interstate perspective) with Peterson, supra 
note 2 1 3 ,  at 302-08 (embracing interstate perspective) . See Casad, supra note 2 1 0 ,  at 59-60. 
Elaborating his views on the appropriate policy analysis, Professor Peterson writes: 
Several conclusions may be drawn at this point. First, it is apparent that new 
policy factors appear when the res judicata doctrine is lifted from its domestic 
context and applied to nondomestic judgments . If we truly wish to account for 
these factors in a policy-oriented approach to the problem of foreign-country 
judgments, however, we must be prepared to account for those policies which 
strengthen the res judicata rationale as well as for those which weaken it. Two such 
strengthening factors have been described as the ordering principle and the policy 
of finality for American judgments raised abroad. These policies complement the 
policy of ending litigation, which may still be regarded as the basic ingredient of 
the res judicata rationale. 
Peterson, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 307; see also Peterson, supra note 1 88 ,  at 24{) (defending the interstate 
perspective) . 
Professor Peterson's approach has won the day, at least in the literature. See Casad, supra 
note 2 1 0, at 58-6 1 ;  von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2 10 ,  at 1 603-06; Arthur T. von Mehren, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional 
Requirements, 1 67 RECUEIL DES COURS D' ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9, 20-54 ( 1 980) . 
2 1 7. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 210,  at 1 603 (describing "comity" as a "general 
mode of expression that at most expresses an attitude or disposition") . 
2 1 8 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 52-60, 20 1 -09.  
2 1 9 .  See Hilton v. Guyot, 1 59 U.S. 1 1 3 ,  1 63-64, 21 0-28 ( 1 895) . 
220 . See Asahi Metal Indus.  v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.  1 02,  1 15 (1 987) (holding that a court, 
in determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant, must "consider the 
procedures and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of 
jurisdiction by [an American] court" (emphasis in original)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,  473 U.S.  6 1 4, 629 ( 1 985) (noting that courts should consider "concerns of 
international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals and sensitivity to 
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes"); Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 4 1 7  U.S. 506, 5 1 6- 1 7  ( 1 974) (stating that the refusal to enforce an international 
arbitration agreement "would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties" that 
would "damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability 
of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements"); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U . S .  1 ,  9 (1 972) ("We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international 
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts . ") .  
22 1 .  Smit, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 56. 
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Just as the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute 
do not hold a monopoly on federalism values in this country/22 even less 
do they hold a worldwide monopoly on law as an instrument of cooperation 
and unification .  Hilton v. Guyot was distinctive in part because, apart from 
the requirement of reciprocity, it cut against the deep grain of American 
isolationism.223 Those who would ignore foreign law and policy in the 
recognition area are in reality calling for a return to isolationism.224 
To be sure, shaping our law of recognition of foreign judgments so 
as , among other things, to enhance international cooperation does not 
require, were it possible, replicating the particular method of achieving 
national unity that Congress selected in the Full Faith and Credit 
Statute. 225 It is, however, difficult to imagine a system that is concerned 
about international accommodation but makes no references to foreign law .  
There are, in any event, good reasons not to replicate interstate 
recognition practice in the international arena. Whether or not the 
substantial theoretical attraction of requiring strict compliance with the 
rendering court's jurisdictional standards226 is thought to justify the costs 
of policing compliance with foreign law,227 it would be very difficult to 
defend a regime of preclusion for jurisdictional findings in foreign 
judgment cases identical to the regime that has evolved in interstate 
cases . 228 Even if we are will ing to abide by the foreign tribunal 's factual 
findings ,229 there should be some opportunity to test whether that tri-
222 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 4- 1 6 .  
223 . See Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for 
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 5 1 5 ,  556-62 ( 1 953); Kurt H .  Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 1 ,  29 1 -304 ( 1 965); Peterson, 
supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 299. 
224. See Smit, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 75; Hans Smit, International Res Judicata in the Netherlands: 
A Comparative Analysis, 1 6  BUFF. L .  REv. 1 65 ,  176 n . 63 ( 1 966). This is not Professor Smit's only 
such call . See Burbank, supra note 1 ,  at 1 482 & n . 1 5 1 , 1 483 n . 1 53 ,  1486 n . 1 77 ,  1 49 1  n.20 8 .  
225. See supra text accompanying note 9 ;  supra note 1 5 .  
226. See Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 ,  a t  1 7  n . 6 5  ( " [T)here is Supreme Court authority which suggests 
that the recognition state may refuse to honor the judgment of a sister-state court that lacked 
'jurisdiction , '  not under constitutional standards but solely pursuant to its own law . "  (citing Treinies 
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.  66 ( 1 939))); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2 1 0 ,  at 1 6 10,  
1 623 , 1 627-28 (discussing the "hallmark" function of the jurisdictional test for determining whether 
to recognize a foreign judgment) . 
227. See Juenger, supra note 1 58 ,  at 1 6- 1 8 .  
228 .  See Sherrer v .  Sherrer, 3 3 4  U.S.  343 ,  356 (1 948) (barring a collateral attack o n  a divorce 
decree where the defendant had an opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues) ; American Sur. Co. 
v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.  1 56, 1 66-67 ( 1 932) (holding that a prior action in state court barred a subsequent 
suit in ferleral court seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the prior judgment for want of jurisdiction); 
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.  522, 525-27 ( 1 93 1) (ruling that a defendant's 
special appearance in federal court barred the defense of want of jurisdiction in a subsequent federal 
suit upon the judgment) . 
229. But see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2 1 0 ,  at 1 627 ( " [T]he rendering court can 
assume jurisdiction on the basis of lax or dishonest fact finding in a contested p roceeding as well as 
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bunal 's assertion of authority to adjudicate was fundamentally fair by 
domestic standards . 230 
If the question is not jurisdiction but rather the scope of preclusive 
effects , there is better reason to adhere to the law of the rendering court. 
In international cases as in interstate cases , the answer to the question 
whether a recognizing court can or should give the rendering court's 
j udgments greater preclusive effects than they would have at home depends 
upon policy focus . Those who see in ful l  faith and credit or foreign 
j udgment recognition practice only the policies of intrastate preclusion l aw 
are not likely to b al k  at giving either interstate or foreign judgments greater 
preclusive effect than they have at home.231 After all ,  if the recognizing 
jurisdiction's l aw cal ls  for preclusion, the shared goal of putting an end to 
l itigation wil l  be served, and the rendering jurisdiction will have no 
complaint. 232 
The argument is short-sighted . A rule of greater preclusive effects ,  
once known, could have a consequential impact on the conduct of the 
initial l itigation, as risk-averse parties treat what should have been a local 
skirmish as if it were a world war. 233 This escalation woul d  impose 
unwanted costs on the foreign court system. Finality is not the only goal 
of full faith and credit,Z34 and it should not be the only goal of foreign 
judgment recognition practice. 235 
Another reason not to accord greater preclusive effects to foreign 
judgments than they would have at home relates to the costs of the contrary 
rule for l itigants .236 Further, in the context of a federal system, " domes-
in one by default. "); id. at 1 626-27 (stating that the absence of review in the original litigation by an 
impartial tribunal, as well as the absence of "political, economic, and legal ties,"  justifies different 
treatment) . 
230.  See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 1 ,  at 585; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 cmt. c (1 987) (discussing the refusal to recognize a 
foreign judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant in the rendering court) . This formulation 
masks an additional inquiry into the appropriateness of the rendering court's exercise of jurisdiction 
according to a standard not employed, and perhaps not employable, by the rendering court but 
supported by the facts. See Juenger, supra note 1 58 ,  at 1 7 .  
23 1 .  See Smit, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 6 3  & n. l26; Eugene F.  Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior 
Litigation, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 742, 749-53 ( 1979) .  
232 .  See Casad, supra note 210,  a t  75 . 
233 . See David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv . 3 1 7 ,  326-27, 
341 (1 978) ("The risk of being bound in a later, unrelated, lawsuit to an adverse finding on an issue 
not litigated in a prior suit might induce parties to litigate all possible  issues to the utmost in the initial 
proceeding . ") ;  cj. James W. Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments,  
35 TUL.  L .  REV. 30 1 ,  309- 10  ( 1 961)  (noting that nonmutual issue preclusion ramifies initial litigation) . 
234. See Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, T1te Scope of Full Faith and Credit to 
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 1 53 ,  1 6 1  ( 1949) . 
235 .  See Peterson, supra note 1 88,  at 239-48; supra text accompanying notes 2 1 9-24. 
236 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 1 7 .  Professor Peterson has described these costs in terms 
of unifmmity in the following manner: 
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tic law "  can be an ambiguous referent. For one l itigating abroad under a 
regime of greater preclus ive effects and concerned about subsequent 
litigation in this country, the rule could require research in the preclusion 
law of fifty-one jurisdictions .237 
Finally, where it is deemed appropriate to resort to "domestic law" 
or  "domestic standards"238 as  a check on foreign judgment recognition 
and enforcement practice, these and other concerns counsel against 
insistence, where possible, on  detailed compliance with local law and in 
favor of checks provided by uniform federal law.239 Usually, as in the 
A second conception of the ordering principle turns the emphasis away from the 
relations of nations and back to the relations of the litigant parties. This can best 
be seen in its negative aspect. A flat refusal to recognize the effect of foreign 
adjudication does not order the legal relationships of the litigants, but on the 
contrary tends to confuse these by producing conflicting duties or contradictory 
relations as between the two or more legal systems with which each of these 
individuals has contact. The promotion of uniformity, whether in terms of status 
or rights or duties, is the policy taproot of most choice of Jaw rules in the conflict 
of laws scheme. That policy would seem to be intensified in its application to the 
foreign judgments problem, because in the latter area the legal relations of the 
individual have become in some degree fixed by the foreign adjudication. 
Adherence to the standard set by the foreign judgment will promote this uniformity 
just as ignoring the foreign judgment will tend to destroy it. Enforcement and 
recognition can therefore serve an ordering principle with respect to individuals, by 
providing a rational process for sorting out their private legal relations when they 
are caught in a snarl of litigation in two different legal systems. 
Peterson, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 306 (footnote omitted); cf Casad, supra note 2 10,  at 75 ("[G]iving the 
judgment more extensive issue preclusion effect than it would have in the rendering country could often 
mean unanticipated prejudice to the losing party and unexpected benefit to the winner."). 
237.  See Peterson, supra note 2 1 3 ,  at 307 n . 85 ; supra text accompanying notes 1 6 1-63 . Of 
course, uniform federal law could obviate this problem. See Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 ,  at 3 n.6 
(discussing a draft of Swiss legislation that would federalize the "entire body of law dealing with 
foreign country judgments "). 
238 .  See supra text accompanying note 230. 
239. Professor Juenger provides an acute analysis with respect to jurisdictional standards: 
The largest single group of reporting countries measures the foreign 
court's jurisdiction by reference to the bases found in their own laws. At first 
blush, the "mirror-image principle" appears eminently fair. What could be more 
reasonable than to concede as much jurisdiction to the rendition state as the 
recognition state claims for itself? In reality, however, this version of the Golden 
Rule is at once too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because the fornm 's 
rules may be unduly restrictive, which jeopardizes the recognition ofjudgments that 
rest on an otherwise unobjectionable basis. Conversely, the mirror-image principle 
projects into the foreign legal system all of the recognition state's jurisdictional 
assertions, however extravagant they may be. In effect, it endorses foreign 
exorbitance by honoring j udgments of courts that lack a reasonably close 
relationship to the dispute. 
No doubt, the objective of the mirror-image principle, i.e., the congruence 
of " indirect" and "direct" jurisdiction, has a certain visceral appeal. But the 
adoption of a single standard for adjudication and recognition makes sense only if 
that standard is finely tuned. To work well, the jurisdictional bases used must be, 
on the one hand, sufficiently broad and, on the other, subject to constraints that 
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case of federal l imitations on assertions of adj udicatory jurisdiction240 or 
on provisions for notice and an opportunity to be heard,241 the rules w il l  
have their source i n  the Constitution .  Occasionally, there may b e  a 
pertinent treaty that, although not dealing directly with recognition and 
enforcement, indirectly constrains the operation of otherwise appl icable 
law. For instance, it would subvert the Hague Service Convention242 to 
deny recognition to a foreign judgment in an action in which service 
complied w ith the Convention but did not satisfy the detailed requirements 
of local l aw .  243 
My hope, of course, is that before too long, the appl icable uniform 
federal law w il l  be provided by a treaty or series of treaties directly 
regul ating the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments . 
effectively curtail excessive assertions, Mechanisms to achieve fine-tuning exist 
only in federal =tions such as the United States, whose Supreme Court exercises 
constitutio=l control over state court jurisdiction, and in quasi-federal systems such 
as the European Communities, where the Brussels Convention establishes 
jurisdictional rules that are binding on the member states and whose interpretation 
is supervised by the Communities' Court of Justice. 
Juenger, supra note 158 ,  at 15 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) . 
240. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S .  102 (1 987). 
241 . See, e.g. , Mennonite Bd . of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 ( 1 983) . 
242. CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTR.<\JUDICLA.L DOCUMENTS IN 
C IVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, Nov. 1 5 ,  1965, 20 U .S .T. 361 , 658 U.N.T.S. 163 .  
243 . See Ackermann v .  Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1 986) . 
